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A WHOLE NEW GAME: RECOGNIZING THE CHANGING
COMPLEXION OF INDIAN GAMING BY REMOVING
THE "GOVERNOR'S VETO" FOR GAMING ON
"AFTER-ACQUIRED LANDS"t
Brian P. McClatchey*
The recent explosive growth of the Indian gaming industry and judicial decisions
analyzing a portion of the governing statute point to an inherent flaw in the
mechanism provided by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) for the estab-
lishment of off-reservation gaming enterprises. This Note argues for a reform of
the so-called "after-acquired lands" provision of IGRA, which would remove the
governor's concurrence requirement and place the decision to allow Indian gam-
ing off-reservation into the negotiating process between states and tribes, as
another term to be negotiated between sovereigns. Such a reform would allow
states and tribes alike to extract their best possible respective deals, while at the
same time ensuring maximum respect for state and tribal sovereignty. The Note
concludes by proposing statutory language to accomplish this task.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Indian gaming industry has exploded in scope from its be-
ginnings in the late 1970's as a collection of small enterprises to a
full-fledged industry, generating tens of billions of dollars in reve-
nues annually.' It is indeed a whole new game, in both economic
and non-economic terms. Despite its tremendous success, however,
Indian gaming is still very controversial. 2 Many non-Indians see
t © 2004 by Brian P. McClatchey. All rights reserved.
* B.A. 2002, University of Washington; J.D. candidate, University of Michigan Law
School; Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. The author wishes to thank
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support and encouragement.
1. The National Indian Gaining Commission (NIGC) reported total revenues from
Indian gaming at nearly $8.5 billion in 1998, $9.8 billion in 1999, nearly $11 billion in 2000,
$12.8 billion in 2001, and almost $14.5 billion in 2002. NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMIS-
SION, TRIBAL GAMING REVENUES, available at: http://www.nigc.gov/nigc/nigcControl?
option=TRIBALREVENUE (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) [hereinafter NIGC]. For those same years, the number of gaming facilities climbed
from 297 to 330. Id.
2. See Iver Peterson, Despite Promise of Easy Money, Indian Casinos Meet Resis-
tance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004, at A29:
Throughout the Northeast and across the country, casinos hold out the promise of
easy money to balance budgets, cut taxes and increase school spending, yet in an odd
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Indian casinos as a manifestation of the worst kind of race-based
exceptionalism, an option available solely to the 4.1 million
Americans who identify themselves as Indians. s
In this way, the success of Indian gaming arguably threatens
accepted notions of Indianness,4  under which "Indians act
appropriately when they market their traditions and their past, and
they act inappropriately when they attempt to break into the big
league of white entrepreneurship, such as the gambling industry."5
"Appropriate" industries are organic farming, fishing, light
manufacturing and "the production and marketing of Native
American art.,6 As well, the media convey images "of Indian tribes
across the country wallowing in gambling dollars and driving non-
inversion of the usual public eagerness for new investment and more jobs, opposi-
tion to the casino industry is, if anything, picking up strength, particularly where
casinos already exist. It is a situation Mayor Anthony M. Masiello of Buffalo knows
well.... "What is shocking to me is that if you had any other company that was going to
employ 2,500 people and pay them $30,000 a year and up and generate millions of dol-
lars in private investment, people would be falling all over them," Mayor Masiello said in
an interview. "I don't know what the big deal is."
Id.
3. See STELLA U. OGUNWOLE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. C2KBR/01-15, THE
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2000 1 (2002).
4. The fluidity of this accepted notion is remarkable. Indians have often been seen as
the poorest of the poor; now they are nearly uniformly seen as wealthy, flush with casino
cash. Tribal chairman Deron Marquez states that "[n]obody was interested in us until we
began to make money .... Our neighbors want us to be like 'Dances with Wolves,' but we'd
rather be accountants and lawyers." David DeVoss, California Gambling: Heap Big Casinos in
Residential Neighborhoods, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 15, 2003, at 18. See a/soJerry Unseem, The
Big Gamble; Have American Indians Found Their New Buffalo?, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 22 ("The
gambling boom has added a new stereotype to an already overstuffed quiver of Indian
myths and clichhs: the rich Indian.").
5. See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and
Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 25, 44 (1997)
(tracing the history and permutations of one version of the consent principle from the
original treaty period to today's era of analogous agreements between sovereigns).
6. SeeJOHN LYMAN MASON & MICHAEL NELSON, GOVERNING GAMBLING: A CENTURY
FOUNDATION REPORT 74-75 (2001). The notion of gambling as "culturally inappropriate"
for Indians seems omnipresent:
Native American Indians have for decades experienced poverty, alcoholism, lack of
education, dismal business success and high unemployment rates. Thus, there are
many who view casino gaming as a 'once in a lifetime' opportunity for tribes to estab-
lish parity with the white culture that values everything in economic terms. But there
is a growing concern that the cultural values and traditions of the Native American
Indians will be compromised.
Id. See also NINETEENTH HAWAII STATE LEGISLATURE, DEP'T OF BUSINESS, ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT, AND TOURISM, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SHIPBOARD GAMING AND PARI-
MUTUEL HORSE RACING IN HAWAII, CHAPTER 2: TRENDS IN THE U.S. GAMING INDUSTRY,
available at: http://www.hawaii.gov/dbedt/gaming/trends.html (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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Indian competitors in the casino industry in places like Las Vegas
and Atlantic City out of business with their unfair advantages."7
The Indian gaming debate is truly multifaceted and far-reaching.
Indian Country is frequently the setting for the power struggle
inherent in federalism, as states challenge federal authority over
the formerly fully sovereign Indian nations' occupying reserva-
tions.' States often "assert their sovereign rights in defiance of the
7. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 741
(4th ed. 1998).
8. In answering whether the Cherokees were to be considered a separate nation,
ChiefJustice John Marshall noted that
[t] hey have been uniformly treated as a state since the'settlement of our country. The
numerous treaties made with them by the United States recogni[z]e them as a peo-
ple capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of being responsible in
their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression
committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community
.... The acts of our government plainly recogni[z]e the Cherokee nation as a state;
and the Courts are bound by those acts .... They may more correctly perhaps be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we as-
sert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession
when their right of possession ceases-meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage.
Their relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 1-2 (1831).
The next year, the Court declared that
[t]he Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of
the soil, from time immemorial .... The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct com-
munity, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519-20 (1832).
9. The Constitution itself was, in part, an attempt to reconcile the conflict between
the power of states and the federal government with respect to the Indian tribes. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 42, at 206 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). Madison criticized the
failings of the Articles of Confederation with respect to clearly setting forth the relational
scheme between the tribes and the state and federal governments, claiming that
[t]he regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes [in the new Constitution] is very
properly unfettered from the two limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which
render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to
Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the
legislative right of any State within its own limits .... And how the trade with Indians,
though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be
regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of
legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case in which the
Articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish
impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with compleat
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national government."' Indian gaming is often the ground for
conflict, and in that connection, this Note examines, with respect
to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act's (IGRA) "after-acquired
lands" provision," the extent to which state governors should be
able to exercise power over tribal gaming outside reservation
boundaries. This Note argues that states are overreaching in their
efforts to restrict off-reservation gaming, and that overreaching
must be restrained and re-channeled in a way more closely aligned
with IGRA's original paradigm. Tribal-state gaming compacts un-
der IGRA were meant to be analogous to contracts rather than a
continuation of the "hodge-podge of personal grudges, ad-hoc
policies, inconsistent judicial decisions, and a general exercise of
ignorance about Indians"'2 known as federal Indian law. A renewed
recognition of this principle would greatly benefit both tribes and
states.
This Note proposes that IGRA's "after-acquired lands" provision
be amended by removing the state governor's concurrence re-
quirement. This would leave the location of Indian casinos, along
with any other conditions the parties choose to address, up to the
compacting process, 13 supervised by the Secretary of the Interior.
14
sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and
letting the whole remain.
Id.
10. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL TRIBULATIONS 20 (1999).
11. 25 U.S.C. § 2719 (2000).
12. See DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 10, at 33-34.
13. A compact is "[a]n agreement or covenant between two or more parties, esp. be-
tween governments or states." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 274 (7th ed. 1999). See also infra
note 69.
14. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (8) (2000) (stating that the Secretary of the Interior has the
duty to review and approve proposed tribal-state compacts). See also Tsosie, supra note 5, at
38:
In fact, Indian natural resource disputes typically involve three levels of govern-
ment-state, federal, and tribal-and the conflicts over sovereignty and power that
this entails. Indian tribes are politically the least powerful of these sovereigns, pri-
marily because, unlike the states, they have no formal representation in Congress.
Moreover, the federal government, which is entrusted with protecting the tribes, of-
ten has multiple conflicting responsibilities that interfere with its duty to the tribes,
although the tribes have no protection from this. In fact, the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted this inevitable conflict of interest as excusing the government from
following the 'fastidious standards of a private fiduciary' when exercising its trust re-
sponsibilities to the tribes. Indeed, the government's duty to the American public
may frequently override its duty to the Indian tribes. This conflict between domestic
sovereigns raises issues of federalism, such as the extent of the federal government's
power to adjudicate state and tribal interests through legislation, and whether tribal
interests can fairly be adjudicated through the political process or by federal or state
A Whole New Game
Following this introduction, Part II recounts a brief history of
Indian gaming. Part III introduces IGRA, including the classes of
gaming and compacting provisions, and ends with an explanation
of the "after-acquired lands" provision itself. Part IV analyzes re-
cent case law dealing with this provision, arguing that the cases
point up the "after-acquired lands" provision's constitutional and
policy flaws. Part V sets out concrete proposals for reform and Part
VI concludes that § 2719 of IGRA must be amended to remove the
constitutional infirmities and update the compacting framework to
reflect the new contours of the Indian gaming industry.
In spite of all the controversy, Indian gaming is "perhaps [the]
most strategic"1' economic choice tribes have made, and an advan-
tageous choice for tribal economic development due to "the low
strain on natural resources and the high profit margin.' '16 Gaming
furthers tribal self-determination "inasmuch as [the tribes] eco-
nomically support themselves with their own resources and are not
dependent upon federal subsidies. 17 Though controversial, sup-
port for Indian gaming in Congress remains strong.
This Note operates under the assumption that tribes aggressive
and savvy enough to open negotiations with states for class III' s
gaming compacts are active and skilled negotiators, and should be
allowed to bargain freely with states in pursuit of their economic
goals. As will be shown, allowing states to continue to use the "gov-
ernor's veto" as a means to escape a disadvantageous deal does not
comport with the underlying freedom of contract assumptions of
IGRA or of the "treaty federalism"' 9 paradigm.
courts. For example, tribal water rights are typically adjudicated in state court by
judges who are generally elected to office and serve a non-Indian constituency that
may be quite hostile to Indian claims. Given these concerns, negotiated settlements
may be more responsive to providing an adequate balance of power between states
and tribes.
Id.
15. See INDIAN GAMING: WHO WINS? viii (Angela Mullis & David Kamper eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Mullis & Kamper].
16. Id.
17. Id. at ix.
18. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2000); see also infra note 74.
19. "Treaty federalism" refers to the notion that the tribes are currently in a position,
vis-a-vis the United States, approximating the situation that existed during the treaty-making
period, wherein they were able to define their relationship with the federal government by
treaty. The emergence of tribal-state gaming compacts, water use agreements, child welfare
agreements, and cooperative law enforcement compacts, among others, testify to the use-
fulness of this label. Professor Richard Monette has explained treaty federalism as
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Congress enacted the IGRA ° in an effort to prevent state gov-
ernment overreaching in disputes over gambling on reservations.
The IGRA was a balancing act, but some of its provisions have be-
come untenable under the intense heat of political, media, and
legal scrutiny. Although IGRA's underlying motivation was the
creation of a "separate sphere" of sorts for Indian gaming by seg-
regating casinos on reservations, that philosophy nears inadequacy.
"It is quite clear that back in 1988, when gaming bills were under
consideration, Congress did not envision the explosion of Indian
gaming or the acrimonious litigation it would spawn., 21 As tribal
gaming makes the transition from a reservation-based industry to
one restricted only by access to markets, flaws in IGRA are re-
vealed.
These proposals help tribes exercise full sovereignty, but they
also protect state sovereignty, since both parties would be free to
approach the compacting process with more to offer and more to
gain than the current process allows. It would also ensure that
states allowing gambling will have to deal with Indian gaming on
its own terms and with a view toward expanding the potential
benefit for each side, rather than holding out for all or nothing
and using the "governor's veto" as a deus ex machina when con-
fronted with disadvantageous terms. By expanding the possible
outcomes for tribes and states with these proposals, IGRA could
finally approach its potential as a real force for broad-based tribal
economic development. Although gaming economies are not the
the relationship between the Union, Indian tribes and their citizens. Tribes were
once entirely free from incursion by our Union and its states, their spheres of sover-
eignty as impermeable as any other international sovereign. Simply put, they no
longer are .... [The] [f]irst [implication of this is], within our federal system, the
Union, states and tribes do not constitute three distinct sovereigns but two distinct
planes of sovereignty. The tribes share the sovereign plane not with the Union but
with the states. Second, the 'interactive' relationship between the Union and the
tribes reflects the relationship between the Union and the states. Third, like the Un-
ion/state relationship, the Union/tribe relationship has provided a means for
experimenting with federalism, at times testing its elasticity to the point of subver-
sion. Fourth, the relationship between the states and the tribes should reflect the
relationship between two states as sovereigns within the same system, on the same
plane, whose sovereign spheres do not overlap but influence each other through the
federal political processes.
Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United
States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617,
618-19 (1994).
20. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
21. Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST. THOMAS L.
REv. 769, 770 (1995).
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ideal way to start," gaming appears to be the most powerful trans-
formative force to appear in Indian Country in generations."2
As gaming flourishes across Indian Country, more tribes seek to
enter urban markets, and states try to contain Indian gaming.24
States are in a precarious position, balanced between their desire
for increased revenues from Indian gaming and their historic ten-
dency to 'jealously try to protect other gaming industries who
struggle to compete for entertainment dollars. '2 5' Often faced with
staggering budget deficits, states see Indian gaming revenue as a
source of easy money. Tribes and states alike have much to gain by
increasing the market access Indian gaming establishments enjoy.
22. See David W. Marston, America Bets on Gambling, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 31, 2001,
available at: http://www.demews.com/2001/hometech/0104/09/hs-f30-206337.htm (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (quoting former President
Clinton's statement, made during his presidential candidacy, that "[g]ambling is a lousy
basis for an economy"). Notwithstanding the essential truth of that statement, the fact re-
mains that no other economic venture in Indian Country has come close to the profitability
of gaming. Perhaps the President's statement should be understood as a prognostication
regarding the sustainability of tribal gaming; he would find many in agreement.
23. The economic development of some tribes is attributable to revenue sources
other than gaming. Two notable examples are the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes' operations and Mississippi Choctaw Tribe's enterprises. In 1999, "the Choctaw be-
came the first Indian tribe to move operations offshore when its Chahta Enterprise-an
assembler of wiring harnesses for cars-opened a 1,700 worker factory in Mexico. 'We're
running out of Indians,' a tribal official explained at the time." See Unseem, supra note 4.
Also, the Ho-Chunk Nation in Nebraska is an example of a newly prosperous tribe that
began with a gaming economy and successfully made the transition into non-gaming
sources of revenue.
24. Foes of Indian gaming often premise their opposition on the social costs imposed
by gambling generally. However, it is instructive that most of the energy of these groups
(such as Stand Up for California) is expended in fighting Indian gaming, and not the gam-
bling industry generally. See STAND UP FOR CALIFORNIA website, available at: http://
standup.quiknet.com/indiangambling (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform) (containing small sections on charitable gambling, off-track betting, and
internet gambling, but aiming mostly at Indian gaming issues). Some residents of rural
areas, where Indian reservations are usually located, object to the increased traffic and po-
lice presence in their communities. Some, like Pete McCloskey, resident of the Capay Valley
where the Rumsey Band of Wintun Indians are operating their Cache Creek Casino (the
largest in Northern California) have
concluded that the only way to save the Capay Valley is to legalize gambling state-
wide, so that the mostly urban gamblers can stay closer to home. 'If gambling
becomes legitimate all over the state, I don't think you will find people living in the
city coming out to these previously unspoiled communities,' he said.
Rone Tempest, Indian Casino has Rural Residents Up in Arms, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at B1.
25. Edward Sullivan, Reshuffling the Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 45 SYRACUSE L.R~v. 1107, 1150 (1995).
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With so much at stake, the negotiation environment surrounding
Indian gaming is increasingly rich for all concerned. 6
With a few exceptions, such as in California
2 7 and Connecticut,2s
Indian reservations are generally not attractive markets for gaming.
In fact, the National Indian Gaming Commission's (NIGC) numbers
show that most tribes enjoy modest success,0 since most reservations
are rural and isolated. 30 Geographic isolation, strained state budgets,
and a growing Indian gaming industry create the current contro-
versy over off-reservation gaming: "states that are interested in the
potential of revenue sharing with tribes [are] encouraging tribes to
focus selecting gaming location[s] on new lands based solely on
market potential.' In this environment, off-reservation casinos are
becoming increasingly prevalent. Casinos in Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Marquette, Michigan; and Airway Heights, Washington have been in
operation for several years,32 and are the only off-reservation casinos
to have made it through the approval process in the past fifteen
years.3 Very recently however, the Seneca Nation concluded an
agreement with the state of New York involving off-reservation sites,
fueled by the state's hunger for increased revenue and the long-
standing desire for economic development in the economically-
depressed Buffalo/Niagara Falls area.34 Unfortunately, while exami-
nation of off-reservation gaming is increasing, IGRA currently does
26. See Gavin Clarkson &Jim Sebenius, Tribal-State Negotiations: Applying the Lessons from
Foxwoods (unpublished, on file with the author) (analyzing the negotiating dynamic be-
tween the state of Connecticut and the Mashantucket Pequots, both "at the table," and
"away from the table," to develop a framework for analysis of other tribal-state compacting).
27. California presents great chances for the success of tribal gaming operations be-
cause it has locations relatively close to the population centers of San Diego, Los Angeles,
and San Francisco. The casinos run by the Morongo and Barona Bands of Mission Indians
and the Sycuan and Viejas Bands of Kumeyaay Indians have done quite well as a result.
28. Connecticut, of course, is home to the largest casinos in the world, owned by the
Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan Indian tribes, respectively. Each of these casinos
grosses over one billion dollars annually. Again, the reason for this tremendous success is
the fact that they are in relatively close proximity to Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. See
Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 26.
29. See NIGC, supra note 1.
30. See Michael Nelson, From Rez to Riches, AM. PROSPECT, May 21, 2001, at 43.
31. See Oversight Hearing on the Indian Gaming Act Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Aurene M. Martin, Acting Assistant Secretary-Indian
Affairs, Department of the Interior) [hereinafter Martin Statement]. The primacy of prox-
imity to markets to the success of Indian gaming operations is lost on no one. See Courtenay
Thompson &Jeanie Senior, Decision on Casino Site Will Deal New Hand, OREGONIAN, Oct. 24,
1999, at C1 (quoting Spirit Mountain Casino Chief Executive Bruce Thomas: "'All tribes by
historical circumstance are remote, so why wouldn't another tribe that doesn't have a mar-
ket it likes seek a better market'").
32. See Martin Statement, supra note 31.
33. Id.
34. See generally Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 26.
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not allow for the sort of compacting that will be needed as the in-
dustry changes.
Two recent cases, Confederated Siletz Tribes of Or v. United State5 and
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v.
United States,3 6 illustrate the increasing interest in gaming on "after-
acquired lands,"s7 as well as the infirmities of the statute, constitu-
tionally and as a matter of policy. This Note argues that these cases
were wrongly decided, since they failed to recognize that the "after-
acquired lands" provision of IGRA is unconstitutional under the
Appointments Clause38 and the separation of powers doctrine. From
a policy perspective, keeping the "after-acquired lands" provision
maintains a sharply unbalanced bargaining environment for Indian
gaming in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida:s'  "[s] tonewalling states are now virtually immune
35. 841 E Supp. 1479 (D. Or. 1994) aff'd but criticized, 110 E3d 688 (9th Cir. 1997),
amended on denial of reh 'g cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1027 (1997).
36. 259 F. Supp. 2d 783 (W.D. Wis. 2003), No. 03-2323, 2004 WL 909159 (7th Cir.
2004).
37. The constitutionality of the analogous ability, under 25 U.S.C. § 465, of the Secre-
tary to take land into trust off-reservation was considered in South Dakota v. United States
Dep't of Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 919 (1996),
mandate recalled, opinion vacated, 106 F.3d 247 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding the ability to take
off-reservation land into trust for tribes under 25 U.S.C. § 465 as a valid exercise of the Ex-
ecutive power).
38. This has, in fact, been a concern throughout the history of the Act. In the run-up
to the enactment of IGRA, the Justice Department voiced concern about an analogous pro-
vision of one of IGRA's predecessors, S. 1303, which would
give individuals not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, Article
II, section 2, clause 2, the authority to waive a federal statute. In order to avoid the
constitutional problems inherent in such a situation, [the bill] should be revised to
begin 'Subject to the approval of the Secretary,' a change that would ensure that im-
plementation of this part of the statute remains in the hands of a properly appointed
federal officer.
S. REP. No. 100-446, at 3102 (1988). Needless to say, this course was not taken.
39. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). For a strong doctrinal attack on Seminole Tribe, see Laura
Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbuy: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REv. 406
(1999). Professor Fitzgerald notes that the Court in Seminole Tibe "preserv[ed] the power to
grant itself jurisdiction where Congress is constitutionally barred," by claiming "the
institutional right, where private lawsuits challenge state interest, to have not just the last
word but the only word on the scope of its constitutional authority." Id. at 482.
The decision can also be challenged on the grounds that it is evidence of the unprinci-
pled inconsistency in the construction and application of the commerce clause. The Court
noted in Seminole Tribe that "the Interstate Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, [because] the power to regulate interstate commerce
'would be incomplete without the authority to render states liable in damages."' 517 U.S. at
59 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (citations omitted)). Given
this, it remains unclear why the "Indian Commerce Clause" power should be considered
any less complete absent an equivalent power to render states liable in damages.
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to legal challenges.""0 Tribal-state gaming compacts were meant to
be negotiated on an even field for mutual benefit, and tribes and
states should be able to freely bargain in good faith on the points
in which they are most interested. Congress 3hould therefore
amend IGRA by removing the "after-acquired lands" provision.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIAN GAMING
A. Introduction
Indians have historically been the poorest members of American
society. Unfortunately, they remain so,4' and the evidence is not
solely economic: "Native Americans have a poverty rate 2 1/2 times
the national average, a suicide rate nearly twice as high, and an
alcoholism rate six times greater."2 Indian gaming has helped ease
reservation poverty to some extent. Nationwide, Indian gaming is
expected to be a $15 billion industry in 2004, accounting for 36%
of national gaming revenues. 4s The growth has been tremendous:
as recently as 1998, Indian gaming accounted for just 15% of the
nationwide gambling market.44 Often called the "new buffalo,"
tribal gaming has brought tremendous prosperity to some Indian
tribes.' Managed well, gaming income can fund tribal govern-
40. Nelson, supra note 30.
41. U.S. Census data for 1990 show that the median American Indian family's income
was $21,619, as compared with the national median income of $35,225. Also, a staggering
27.2% of American Indian families live in poverty, versus 10% of the national population.
When individuals rather than families are compared, the discrepancy grows even larger:
13% of the national population lives in poverty, as compared with 31.2% of the American
Indian population. See U.S. CENSUS, SELECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
FOR THE 25 LARGEST AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES: 1990, available at: http://www.census.gov/
population.socdemo/race/indian/ailang2.txt (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
42. Unseem, supra note 4.
43. Mark Fogerty, Boom Times for Indian Casinos, Says Merrill Lynch, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAYJuly 10, 2003, available at: http://www.indiancountry.com/?1057842844 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
44. See MASON & NELSON, supra note 6, at 57.
45. The name might prove apt, since gaming provides the livelihood that the old buf-
falo did:
The recent trend of casino gambling on Indian lands has been likened to the mythi-
cal return of the buffalo. The great beast that once darkened the plains and provided
Indians with sustenance has returned in the guise of slot machines, blackjack tables,
roulette wheels and bingo cards. Many Indian nations in the United States have
gained political clout from high stakes casino gambling. More importantly, gaming
proceeds have raised impoverished nations from the depths of despair.
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ments according to tribal priorities and in response to tribal needs.
Perhaps, in this area, federal policy "has finally provided tribes
with a path to meaningful self-sufficiency."46 Gaming is not a pana-
cea,4 7 but given impetus by "[a] combination of Republican
presidents promoting a 'New Federalism' ... and Democratic con-
gresses that were sympathetic to the causes of ethnic and racial
minorities, '" it is a step on the road to true self-determination, the
goal of the federal government for over 30 years.4 9
Indian tribes are not the only beneficiaries of tribal gaming.'s
The economies of surrounding communities prosper as well, since
Sherry M. Thompson, Comment, The Return of the Buffalo: An Historical Survey of Reservation
Gaming in the United States and Canada, 11 Aalz.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 520, 521 (1994). Gam-
ing, like the old buffalo, seems to be under constant attack. Only time will tell if the new
buffalo will go the way of the old one.
46. Written Testimony of Chairman Herman A. Williams, Jr., Tulalip Tribes of Washington, Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs (July 9, 2003).
47. In fact, for many tribes, like the Salish-Kootenai of Montana, IGRA can be charita-
bly characterized as a modest success: "As a result of the myriad competitive factors, [such as
widespread legalized gambling in Montana and the remote locations of tribal casinos,]
gaming revenues are only a small part of the Salish-Kootenai Tribes' annual $24 million
budget, providing only 7 percent of the total income." Tom Zoellner, Montana: The Last,
Worst Place for Indian Gaming, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Aug. 11, 2003, available at:
http://indiancountry.com/?1060605635 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
48. MASON & NELSON, supra note 6, at 59.
49. President Nixon stated:
The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a
new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian deci-
sions.... This ... must be the goal of any new national policy toward the Indian
people: to strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening his sense
of community.
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy,
H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 (1970).
50. For example, in California, for the year ending July 2003, tribal government em-
ployment grew by 17.8%. See Louis Sahagun, Indian Gambling Looks Beyond the Reservations,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at Al. Furthermore, about 90% of the 40,300 workers employed
by tribal gaming operations are non-Indian. Id. See also RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF THE
HOTEL EMPLOYEES AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO FOR THE
COACHELLA VALLEY COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL CASINOS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON A CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY: A Focus ON THE PALM SPRINGS AREA IN THE COA-
CHELLA VALLEY AND THE CASINO OPERATIONS OF THE AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF MISSION
INDIANS 1 (Feb. 2003) [hereinafter H.E.R.E. REPORT], stating:
Tribal casinos are providing unprecedented financial security to numerous Indian
communities throughout the state. The casinos have created thousands of jobs. In
many areas, these casinos are both the largest and fastest growing employers and, in
some cases, are providing both good wages and affordable family healthcare for em-
ployees. The number of jobs in Indian casinos expanded 12.1% in California last
year, while statewide employment grew by only 0.7%.
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Indian gaming creates jobs in construction and the service sector.
The gaming industry can provide a "ripple effect" of supplier and
vendor jobs, which naturally accompany the relatively large busi-
nesses such as the hotel and casino operations now often seen in
Indian Country.5' Also, tribal members with per capita payments
52
to spend will largely do so off-reservation, in nearby cities and
towns. Property values near tribal developments will increase, and
tribes will be able to provide the infrastructure and policing ser-
vices that counties and towns formerly provided.
Id. See also Tom Wanamaker, Is It 'Revenue Sharing' or Extortion'?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY,
July 18, 2003, at http://indiancountry.com/?1058545812 (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("A University of Connecticut study performed in 2000
said that directly or indirectly, the [Mashantucket Pequot] tribe is responsible for 43,000
jobs in that state; the tribe directly employs 11,000 people.").
51. See Lou Michel, Senecas Asking to Buy Convention Center, BUFF. NEws,June 15, 2003,
at C1 ("'We bring a lot economically to Buffalo. We're going to generate 2,500 to 3,000
jobs. I cannot stress enough the economic spin-off effects,' [Seneca President Rickey L.]
Armstrong said. 'More people will be coming to the city using restaurants, hotels and going
to [watch] the [Buffalo] Sabres [hockey team].'").
52. Many tribes that have gaming operations distribute some percentage of their prof-
its to their members as "per capita" payments. The exact amount is the subject of wild
speculation among non-Indians and foes of Indian gaming. In truth, large per capita pay-
ments are the exception rather than the rule, for several reasons. First, many tribes are
reluctant to distribute per capita payments when the tribe requires the funds for critical
infrastructure needs and debt service. Even if infrastructure or debt service are not issues,
IGRA itself limits the uses of casino income. The Act states:
net revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes other than-to
fund tribal government operations or programs; to provide for the general welfare of
the Indian tribe and its members; to promote tribal economic development; to do-
nate to charitable organizations; or to help fund the operations of local government
agencies.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2000). Also, any plan to make per capita payments to tribal
members must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (3)
(2000). Finally, many tribes simply do not, as a matter of fact, generate the tremendous
sums of casino revenue created by the likes of Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun. For example,
the Confederated Tribes of the Grande Ronde of Oregon paid out $2,800 to each of its
4,500 members in 1999. SeeJeff Hinckle, Per Caps, Am. INDIAN REP., Mar. 2001, at 13. Fur-
ther evidence of the per capita payment discrepency is that "[tihe Fort McDowell Indian
Community of Arizona and the Saginaw Chippewa of Michigan both reportedly issued
about $30,000 in per caps to their respective members in 1999. Meanwhile, the 2,100 mem-
bers of the Confederated Tribes of Umatilla of Oregon saw annual bonuses of $825, thanks
to their Wildhorse Resort." Id. In fact, of the 330 tribal gaming facilities in operation in
2002, only 41 had revenue of $100 million or more. See NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING
COMMISSION, TRIBAL GAMING REVENUES, available at: http://www.nigc.gov/nigc/
nigcControl?option=TR1BALREVENUE (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of
Law Reform). Those 41 operations were responsible for nearly $9.4 billion, or almost 65%,
of total Indian gaming revenue in that year. Id.
A Whole New Game
B. Indian Gaming, Pre-Cabazon
Indian casinos have sprung up only in the past quarter century,
but gaming has long been a part of many Indian cultures: "[I]n
traditional Indian gambling stories, good gamblers are pitted
against evil opponents, associated with Euro-American culture,
traditional social vices, and traditional tribal enemies.' 53 One
commentator notes that "Blackfeet accounts describe how Na'pi
(Old Man) brought the hoop and arrow game ... Blackfeet con-
tinue to play traditional betting games., 54 In fact:
References to games are of common occurrence in the origin
myths of various tribes. They usually consist of a description
of a series of contests in which the demiurge, the first man,
the culture hero, overcomes some opponent, a foe of the
human race, by exercise of superior cunning, skill, or magic.
Comparison of these myths not only reveal [s] their practical
unity, but disclose [s] the primal gamblers as those curious
children, the divine Twins, the miraculous offspring of the
Sun, who are the principal personages in many Indian my-
thologies.... Their virgin mother, who appears also as their
sister and their wife, is constantly spoken of as their grand-
mother, and is the Moon or the Earth, the Spider Woman, the
embodiment of the feminine principle in nature. Always con-
tending, they are the original patrons of play, and their games
are the games now played by men."
Culin describes stick games, bone games, and hand games, from
all corners of North America.56 Further, the persistence of tradi-
tional gaming is recognized in federal law. 7 Indian gaming is, in
some respects, a new manifestation of an ancient cultural prac-
58tice.
53. See Paul Pasquaretta, Contesting the Evil Gambler, in Mullis & Kamper, supra note 15,
at 132. See also Mark C. Wenzel, Let the Chips Fall Where They May: The Spokane Tribe's Decision to
Proceed with Casino Gambling without a State Compact, 30 GONZ. L. REv. 467, 473 (1995).
54. See Brad Jolly, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering Policy of Termination
Continues, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273 (1997).
55. STEWART CULIN, GAMES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS VOL. 1 32 (1992).
56. Id. See also infra note 75 (defining class I gaming).
57. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2000) ("Class I gaming on Indian lands is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes and shall not be subject to the provisions of this
chapter.").
58. See CULIN, supra note 55, at 32:
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Traditionally, tribal gaming was a not-for-profit, individual social
activity, but by the 1970s tribes had begun to open small bingo
parlors on their reservations . As these bingo operations became
more successful, states sought to extend their laws over reservation
60lands to regulate, prohibit and/or tax tribal bingo operations.
Students of federal-Indian law again told themselves, "Plus (a
change': "[b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the states





A new front in the continuing battle between tribes and state
governments had been opened.62
There is no evidence that any of the games described were imported into America at
any time either before or after the Conquest. On the other hand, they appear to be
the direct and natural outgrowth of aboriginal institutions in America. They show no
modifications due to white influence other than the decay which characterizes all
Indian institutions under existing conditions.
Id. See also Lawrence LaPoint, Gaming: The Inherent and Legal Right of Indian Nations, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, at B5.
59. Clarkson & Sebenius recount the history of the Oneida and Seminole tribal gam-
ing enterprises: after a 1975 fire on the Oneida Reservation, the tribe "decided to 'raise
money for [their] own fire department the way all fire departments raise money: through
bingo.'" Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 26, at 18 (quoting Dennis McAulliffe, Jr., Casinos
Deal Indians a Winning Hand, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1996, at Al). See also Sioux Harvey, Win-
ning the Sovereignty Jackpot: The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the Struggle for Sovereignty, in
Mullis & Kamper, supra note 15, at 14; W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL SOVER-
EIGNTY AND AMERICAN POLITICS 43 (2000).
60. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying
Bryan v. Itasca County test to Florida's bingo law, holding that Florida had no regulatory
jurisdiction over the tribe, and therefore could not prohibit Indian gaming on the Semi-
nole reservation).
61. See United States v. Kagama, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 1114 (1886); see also Gavin Clarkson, Bull
Conner Would Have Been Proud, HARTFORD COURANT, July 20, 2003, at C3. As one commenta-
tor aptly notes, "[tihe states have been alone among the sovereign levels of government in
their widespread dislike, even resentment, of tribal gambling." MASON & NELSON, supra
note 6, at 71. Students of Indian law can be excused for expressing cynicism where judges
characterize states, vis-A-vis tribes, as "motivated to maximize the public good... [not stand-
ing in relation to tribes in a] 'conflicting and even antagonistic [manner],' and whose
motivations [are not] self-serving." Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians of Wis. v. United States, No. 03-2323, 2004 WL 909159 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936)).
62. See Kevin J. Worthen & Wayne R. Farnsworth, Who Will Control the Future of Indian
Gaming? 'A Few Pages of History are Worth a Volume of Logic', 1996 BYU L. REV. 4047 (1996):
A brief review of some of the prior skirmishes in this ongoing battle reveals that they
often follow a pattern. The conflict generally begins as a dispute between the Tribe
and the States, with the Tribes primarily interested in preserving their autonomy and
the States primarily interested in gaining control of the economic assets under tribal
control. While the States' principal concern has usually been their ability to share in
the material wealth generated on tribal lands, they have often argued in terms of ab-
stract notions of tribal and state sovereignty and the proper relationship between the
federal and state governments in deciding those issues.
A Whole New Game
C. Cabazon Sets the Stage
Florida may have been Indian gaming's modern birthplace, but
the Supreme Court first considered the issue when resolving a
controversy in California. The Court decided that states could not
ban or regulate the conduct of Indian gaming operations on
reservations without explicit congressional consent.63 In applying
its earlier decision in Bryan v. Itasca County,4 the Court found that
Public Law 2805 granted certain states criminal jurisdiction over
Indian lands, but did not grant general civil jurisdiction. Because
California's attempted regulation of the Cabazon and Morongo
Bands of Mission Indians' gaming operations was civil and
regulatory rather than criminal and prohibitory, that state's laws
did not apply on reservations. True, California had an interest in
preventing the conduct of gambling by unscrupulous persons, the
Court said, but the federal interest in tribal self-sufficiency was
stronger: "[s]elf-determination and economic development are
not within reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues and provide
employment for their members. The Tribes' interests obviously
Posed between the two main entities in this conflict is the federal government, whose
plenary power over the Tribes and supremacy over the States enables it to resolve
each particular conflict according to its desires. However, the federal government's
resolution of these skirmishes is usually not the result of a thoughtful balancing of
the Tribe's sovereignty and the State's economic concerns, but rather depends on
larger, more global events which prompt the federal government to be more or less
respectful of state rights on a variety of issues....
Although the exact details of this pattern are not followed in every tribal-state
dispute, the general outline has become so familiar it is arguable that the course of
federal Indian policy is usually not determined by whether the nation is more
interested in preserving tribal sovereignty than in promoting local economic
interests or vice versa, but instead on the general political climate of federal-state
relations at the time. When state and local control is a popular and accepted concept
at the federal level because of events unrelated to Indian policy, federal policy
generally favors State economic interests over tribal cultural or sovereignty interests.
Conversely, the Tribes have their best chance of enlisting federal support, and
therefore prevailing in a particular dispute, when the federal government is
unwilling to trust the States on other non-Indian issues.
Id. See also Professor Tsosie's analysis of the history of tribal-state conflicts over natural re-
source allocation, supra note 5.
63. SeeCalifornia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987).
64. Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (finding that Public Law 280
did not confer general, regulatory power to states over Indian reservations).
65. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588-90; see also Title IV of
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78 (1968).
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parallel the federal interests" 66 in making this happen. The states'
interests had to give way. Due to the Bryan/Butterworth/Cabazon
line of cases, tribes had exclusive control over reservation gaming.
They were understandably loath to allow any state interference in
this exclusivity, and as a result, did not contribute to Congress'
consideration of IGRA.
67
III. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT (IGRA)
A. Enactment and Purpose of IGRA
The states' response to Cabazon was immediate agitation in Con-
gress for legislation to prevent the expansion of Indian gaming. The
result was the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988,'s the Act
which regulates all Indian gaming today and provides the framework
for the negotiated gaming agreements between tribes and states."9
66. 480 U.S. at 219.
67. SenatorJohn McCain (R, Ariz.) noted in his additional remarks regarding IGRA:
It is with great reluctance that I am supporting S. 555 as reported by the Committee.
I characterize my support as reluctant because I believe a different and more
favorable result for Tribes could have been achieved. Unfortunately, Tribes never
banded together and offered their own gaming proposal. They also never found a
consensus for supporting any particular legislative solution. Some would say that
Tribes were united in calling for no gaming legislation, but such a position ignores
the whole debate, and, more importantly, it provides no support to those Members
of Congress who have attempted to craft legislation which would be sensitive to tribal
concerns. The issue has never been: should there be federal regulation of Indian
gaming? Four years of continuous debate on Indian gaming should lead even the
most casual observer of the legislative process to realize that legislation was
inevitable. The focus of debate has always been on what standards and regulations
should govern the conduct of gaming on Indian reservations and lands.
S. REP. No. 100-446, at 3103 (1988).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2000). In fact, S. 555, the bill that became IGRA, was un-
der discussion at the same time the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Cabazon. It
seems clear that Congress's speedy action on IGRA was motivated, at least in part, by the
potential willingness of the Court to support a regime of tribal gaming nearly unfettered by
state regulation.
69. Referred to in IGRA as "tribal-state gaming compacts," presumably the terminol-
ogy is meant to provide an analog to contract law. Individuals and entities enter into
contracts (legally enforceable agreements); states enter into compacts (agreements between
sovereigns). To some extent, then, the concepts of contract law should be kept in the back-
ground of all tribal-state compact negotiations. See also Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in
Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REv. 922, 924 (1999):
A compact is a negotiated agreement between two sovereign entities that resolves
questions of overlapping jurisdictional responsibility, such as law enforcement, or re-
solves certain substantive matters, such as water rights.... Compacts differ from
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The IGRA was meant to achieve "a principal goal of Federal Indian
policy [which] is to promote tribal economic development, tribal
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government."7 ° Under IGRA, "In-
dian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on
Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by
Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a
matter of criminal law and policy, prohibit such gaming activity.'
Congress intended with IGRA to regulate Indian gaming, in an
"attempt to balance the competing interests of Indians, states, and
the federal government in the conduct of gaming activities on
Indian lands. 72 Congress views Indian gaming "as an economic ac-
tivity that Indian tribes can develop, [and of which the tribes] should
be the primary beneficiary."73 Created under Congress' "Indian
Commerce" power," the IGRA completely preempts state regulation
of Indian gaming on Indian land, and has withstood constitutional
challenge.' The Act is also widely seen as an attempt to allay con-
cerns that organized crime would find a haven on Indian
normal contracts because they may be more enforceable, and because contracts,
unlike compacts, do not normally resolve issues of legal entitlement or jurisdiction
between sovereign entities ... compacts are more closely related to treaties in that
they set political policies for tribes and states, and therefore have inherent value even
beyond their stated goals. Unlike treaties, however, compacts can be superseded by
federal law and do not involve transfers of entrusted property without federal over-
sight.
Id.
70. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(3) (2000).
71. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2000). Note also that "neither Cabazon nor IGRA forces a
state to allow forms of gambling that it does not wish to allow. States have the right to bar
unwanted types of gambling from tribal and nontribal lands by refusing to legalize any form
of gambling, as Tennessee, Utah, and Hawaii have done." MASON & NELSON, supra note 6, at
77.
72. See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Indians v. United States, 259 F.
Supp. 2d 783, 786 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
3 See Oversight Hearing on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 108th Cong.
(2003) (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs).
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
75. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990);
see also Legislative History of S. 555 (stating that IGRA is to be construed to completely pre-
empt the field of Indian gaming); State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102
(8th Cir. 1999) (stating that although IGRA completely preempts state control over Indian
gaming on Indian land, it does not prevent state from regulating Indian gaming on non-
Indian land); Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996)
(stating that IGRA satisfies "complete preemption" exception to the "well-pleaded com-
plaint" rule since Congress intended to regulate Indian gaming with a comprehensive
regulatory scheme). But see Oneida Tribe of Wis. v. Wisconsin, 951 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1991)
(finding that although the United States has oversight over Indian gaming, states may exer-
cise some control over class II and class III gaming under IGRA).
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reservations, often seen as lawless enclaves. 71 It is still true that
"[f] ears of organized crime being drawn to Indian country, virtu-
ally all with no factual basis, sustain calls for doing away with this
successful form of Indian economic development."77 However, as
SenatorJohn McCain (R., Ariz.) stated in 1988, "in fifteen years of
gaming activity on Indian reservations there has never been a
clearly proven case of organized criminal activity" ' associated with
Indian gaming. Yet, the specter of organized crime still hovers over
the Indian gaming industry.
76. What remains to be shown is how Indian reservations can remain enclaves of law-
lessness when the state (P.L. 280), federal (under the Assimilative Crimes Act and Major
Crimes Act), and tribal governments have various levels of criminal jurisdiction over Indian
Country. One would think that organized crime would want to operate anywhere but an
Indian reservation, where three sovereigns are on guard. Nevertheless, the notion persists
that organized crime will take over Indian gaming. See, e.g., Jason D. Kolkema, Comment,
Federal Policy of Indian Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands and the Threat to State Sovereignty: Re-
taining Gubernatorial Authority Over the Approval of Gaming on Off-Reservation Sites, 73 U. DET.
MERCY L. R.Ev. 361, 372 n.85 (1996) ("While there are no reported cases of organized crime infiltra-
tion, the possibility still exists." (emphasis added)); see also Sherry M. Thompson, Comment,
The Return of the Buffalo: An Historical Survey of Reservation Gaming in the United States and
Canada, 11 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 521, 550 (1994) ("Many tribal members believe that
organized crime has, in fact, become the bogeyman of Indian gaming. And although there
appears to be little, if any, evidence that the mob is muscling in on Indian casinos, lawmak-
ers have decided to amend the IGRA regardless." (citations omitted)); Oversight Hearing on
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of Bruce G. Ohr, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section Criminal
Division, Dep't of Justice), available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/statementbrucegohr.htm
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform):
The Department has found no evidence of a systematic infiltration of Indian gaming
by elements of organized crime. There have been isolated incidents of organized
crime attempting to infiltrate Indian gaming.... The Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral reported that the Criminal Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the Office of Tribal Justice said that while there is an increasing potential for organ-
ized crime involvement due to growth of Indian gaming revenues, there is a lack of
evidence that such involvement has occurred.
Id.
Again, one would think that any potential for infiltration by organized crime, in hun-
dreds of Indian casinos, would yield more than one footnote in one law review article, citing
to a single magazine article in the period from 1986 to 1996. In fact, the situation in Con-
necticut shows that just the opposite conclusion should be drawn: Indian casinos in that
state have gotten the corrupt players out of the game. The only plausible conclusion is that
these claims, though trumpeted widely, are wholly without merit and should be buried with
little ceremony.
77. GETCHES, supra note 7, at 741.
78. See SEN. REP. No. 100-446, at 3103 (Aug. 3, 1988); see also Rob McDonald, Chips are
Down for Card Rooms; Northern Quest's Fast Start Hurting Other Gaming Facilities, SPOKESMAN-
REVIEW (Spokane, WA), May 22, 2001, at Al (reporting that the crime rate in the City of
Airway Heights, the location of the Kalispel Tribe's off-reservation casino, did not change in
the first quarter of that casino's operation).
A Whole New Game
B. The Substance of IGRA
1. The Definition of Gaming Under IGRA-The IGRA divides In-
dian gaming into three classes. Class I gaming encompasses
traditional games used in ceremonial and social settings, and it is
completely outside the scope of any but tribal regulation and con-
trol.
79
Class II gaming is defined by IGRA as "the game of chance
commonly known as bingo ... including (if played in the same
location) pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and
other games similar to bingo."0 Card games are also included in
class II gaming if they are specifically allowed or not specifically
forbidden by the state "and are played at any location in the
State." Card games under class II must also be "played in confor-
mity with those laws and regulations (if any) of the State regarding
hours or periods of operation of such card games or limitations on
wagers or pot sizes."
82
Class III gaming consists of all gaming that is neither class I nor
class 11.83 This is the area of most contention, since it is the most
profitable class of gaming. Class III gaming includes so-called "Ve-
gas-style" games, such as house-banked card games, roulette, slot
machines, and the like, and is only possible under a governing
tribal-state compact.
4
Once a tribe has passed a tribal gaming ordinance authorizing
gaming on its lands, and the NIGC has approved that ordinance,
the tribe may contact the state to request to enter into negotiations
for a gaming compact." Under IGRA, states are required to "enter
into negotiations with the [requesting] Indian tribe for the pur-
pose of entering into a Tribal-State compact.., in good faith."86 If
the state does not negotiate, or negotiates in bad faith, IGRA gives
tribes a cause of action, accruing after 180 days have passed from
the original request, to compel negotiation. 7 If the tribe and the
state negotiate, they have 60 days to come to an agreement.8 8 If
79. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a) (1) (2000).
80. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (2000).
81. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (A) (ii) (II) (2000).
82. Id.
83. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2000).
84. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2000).
85. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (A) (2000).
86. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i) (2000).
87. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (2000).
88. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (iii) (2000).
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they cannot agree, they are to forward their "last, best" offers to a
mediator who will choose the best proposal, and present it to the
parties for further consideration. 81' If the parties agree to the pro-
posal, it will be treated as an approved Tribal-State compact. If they
cannot agree to the proposal, it is forwarded to the Secretary of
the Interior, who can accept it or reject it and promulgate regula-
tions that will govern the specific case.9
As noted supra, Congress backed up the good faith negotiation
requirement on states with a federal cause of action. However, the
Supreme Court eviscerated it, holding that it was an unconstitu-
tional abrogation of the sovereign immunity of state governments,
guaranteed by the l1th Amendment.91 The apparent limiting fac-
tor in the Court's analysis was the fact that the IGRA was passed
under Congress' Indian Commerce Clause power.
To reach this result, the Court overruled its earlier decision in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas" to "reconfirm that the background
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject
of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that
is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government."93 The
89. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (iv) (2000).
90, See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(vii) (2000); see also 25 C.F.R. § 291.11(c). This latter
provision has survived, despite the objections of commentators that it exceeds the powers of
the Secretary of the Interior. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Lindner-Cornelius, The Secretary of the Inte-
rior as Referee: The States, the Indian Nations, and How Gambling Led to the Illegality of the Secretary
of the Interior's Regulations in 25 C.ER. § 291, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 685 (2001).
91. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
92. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (plurality) (stating that
Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because
"the power to regulate interstate commerce would be 'incomplete without the authority to
render States liable in damages."'). The Court also has stated that
the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clause have very different applica-
tions .... [W]hile the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining
free trade among the States even in the absence of implementing federal legislation
... the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with
plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.... The extensive case law
that has developed under the Interstate Commerce Clause, moreover, is premised on
a structural understanding of the unique role of the States in our constitutional sys-
tem that is not readily imported to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause....
[T] he fact that States and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory
makes it inappropriate to apply Commerce Clause doctrine developed in the context
of commerce 'among' States with mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction to trade
'with' Indian tribes.
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (internal citations omit-
ted).
93. Id. at 72.
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cause of action for the failure of states to bargain in good faith was
accordingly severed from the Act.
2. The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)-IGRA also
created the National Indian Gaming Commission to exercise over-
sight over Indian gaming enterprises by approving class II and III
gaming ordinances, management contracts and class III gaming
compacts. 4 The NIGC is composed of three members, two of
whom must be members of a federally recognized tribe. 5 The
NIGC is required to meet quarterly.9 Although the NIGC has been
the focus of many reform proposals, it is not implicated in this
Note's analysis.
C. IGRA's "After-Acquired Lands" Provision
One goal of the IGRA, from the perspective of the states in-
volved in lobbying for the Act, was to curtail the expansion of
Indian gaming operations. This was done with the so-called "after-
acquired lands" provision:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, gaming
regulated by this chapter shall not be conducted on lands acquired
... after October 17, 1988, unless-
(1) such lands are located within or contiguous to the
boundaries of the reservation of an Indian tribe on October
17, 1988; or
(2) the Indian tribe has no reservation on October 17, 1988.97
There are, however, two alternative exceptions to this rule. The
first of these is that:
Subsection (a) of this section will not apply when-
the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and the
appropriate state and local official, including officials of
nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment
94. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2711, 2712 (2000).
95. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2704(b)(1),(3) (2000).
96. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704(f) (2000).
97. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2719(a)(1),(2) (2000).
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on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the
Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental
to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the
State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the
Secretary's determination.9s
The second alternative exception consists, in turn, of three ele-
ments. Indian land off-reservation may be used for gaming if it was
acquired as part of a land claim settlement, if it is the initial land of a
newly recognized tribe, or if the land is obtained pursuant to a resto-
ration of tribal status.9" The first exception, section 2719(b) (1) (A) of
the IGRA, "as currently written, gives the governor power to effec-
tively veto the secretary's determinations regarding gaming activities
on after-acquired land off the reservation."'00 The propriety of this
power, however, has been, and continues to be, tested in federal
courts,'0 ' which have employed questionable reasoning in uphold-
ing the provision.
98. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b) (1) (A) (2000) (emphasis added).
99. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2719(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) (2000). A tribe is "restored" to federal rec-
ognition if that tribe's relationship with the federal government had been "terminated."
This was the disastrous policy of the federal government from 1945 to 1961:
A turnaround in congressional policy toward Indians resulted in the dramatic depar-
ture from the reforms spearheaded by John Collier that began in the early 1940s.
There were calls from Capitol Hill to repeal the IRA [Indian Reorganization Act]
and to move away from the encouragement of tribal self-government as official fed-
eral policy.
GETCHES, supra note 7, at 204. The termination of a tribe resulted in an end to its recogni-
tion as a government; the tribal land base and assets were to be distributed to its members.
This was accomplished by House Concurrent Resolution 108, August 1, 1953. In order for a
terminated tribe to resume functioning as a governing entity, it must endure formal restora-
tion procedures overseen by the BIA. Tribes that have never been considered governmental
entities can be recognized as such by the BIA's Branch of Acknowledgement and Re-
search-an expensive process that can take years.
Mr. [Eric] Eberhard, a former staff member of the Senate Committee on Indian Af-
fairs who practices law in a Seattle firm with many tribal clients, said costs have been
driven up by the sheer number of groups seeking to become tribes and the scarcity
of experts to back their claims. "It has never been inexpensive, but prior to the ad-
vent of gaming it was reasonable to say it cost between $100,000 and $200,000," he
said. "Now it runs in the millions of dollars because there is a finite pool of experts
available to assist them, and so they go to tribes who have developers who can pay
them."
Iver Peterson, Would-Be Tribes Entice Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at Al.
100. Thomas Gede, Indian Gaming: The State's View, in Mullis & Kamper, supra note 15,
at 75.
101. See supra note 35.
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IV. RECENT CASE LAW ON THE "AFTER-ACQUIRED
LANDS" PROVISION
A. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians
of Oregon v. United States
The Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon asked the
Secretary of the Interior to take 16 acres of land into trust"' status
in 1992 so that they could develop a gaming operation in down-
town Salem, Oregon, nearly fifty miles from their reservation on
the Oregon coast. Many parties opposed the proposal, and Oregon
Governor Barbara Roberts (D) stated in April of 1992 that she did
as well, on grounds that it would be injurious to the City of Salem,
Linn County, and the State of Oregon. By the fall of 1992, how-
ever, the Tribes had garnered approval for its project at the agency
and Portland regional levels of the BIA. In October of that year,
Governor Roberts notified the Department of the Interior that she
did not approve of the project. By November, however, the Secre-
tary of the Interior had issued findings that the project would in
fact be in the best interest of the Tribes, the surrounding tribes,
and the local community. The Secretary formally asked Governor
Roberts for her concurrence in these findings, which she refused
to provide. In December of 1992, Secretary Bruce Babbitt denied
the Tribes' request for acquisition and conversion to trust status
for the parcel of land at issue, citing the "after-acquired lands"
provision of the IGRA and the lack of a governor's concurrence.
The Tribes then brought suit in federal district court, claiming that
the so-called "governor's veto" provision of the IGRA was unconsti-
tutional as a violation of both the doctrine of separation of powers
and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.0 3 The District
Court agreed.
102. See DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 10, at 7:
The heritage of the European/Euro-American claim of legal title to Indian lands has
remained constant from 1492 until the present day. The nomenclature used to dis-
cuss Indian land rights has changed a bit, and we now describe Indian lands as being
held 'in trust' by the United States, a euphemism that simply avoids the necessity of
remembering that Indians, with some rare anomalies, are not thought to own the le-
gal title to their lands and can be dispossessed by the U.S. government at any time.
Id.
103. See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 1479
(D. Or. 1994), aff'd but criticized, 110 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1997), amended on denial of reh'g, cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1027 (1997).
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To the district court, the IGRA's plain language compelled the
understanding that a lack of concurrence by the governor of the
state in which the gaming operation is proposed is fatal to the Sec-
retary's ability to take the land in question into trust: "[I] n fact, the
'but only if' restrictive language precludes the Secretary from
granting an exception to § 2719(a) without satisfying this final
step."10 4 The court held that "the language of § 2719(b) (1) (A) is
unmistakably plain and, therefore, conclusive: If the Secretary
cannot obtain the Governor's concurrence, the Secretary's deter-
mination in favor of granting an exception dies." 10' Yet, this analysis
of the plain language was not conclusive.
The Tribes also claimed that the "governor's veto" violates the
Appointments clause. "governor's veto." The Appointments clause
states that the President "shall ... appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for.,1 6 At issue under this clause was
whether Governor Roberts was acting in the manner of an officer
of the United States, was placed into IGRA's regulatory scheme
and was tasked with deciding a matter of federal law and policy
when she considered whether to concur with the Secretary's de-
termination of the positive effects of the proposed gaming
operation. The district court decided that she was, relying upon
the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo,10 7 in which "Con-
gress, in effect, unconstitutionally empowered the Governor to act
as if she were an officer of the United States appropriately ap-
pointed by Congress to 'serve' pursuant to federal statute and to
exercise significant authority over federal government actions
through a congressional grant of power."10 8 The District Court held
that by empowering, without appointing, an officer (in this case,
Governor Roberts) to exercise a substantial degree of power under
federal law, Congress acted outside the bounds of its Constitu-
tional power.
With respect to the claim that the "governor's veto" violates the
separation of powers doctrine, the court noted that "[t]he core
concern of the Appointments Clause is to ensure that executive
power remains independent."'0 9 The federal system depends, in
part, upon assurances that the legitimate exercise of power by each
104. 841 E Supp. at 1484.
105. Id.
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, c. 2.
107. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
108. 841 E Supp. at 1486-87.
109. Id. at 1487.
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branch will be undisturbed by the others. In this case, however,
Congress created a scheme whereby the Executive branch could
not exercise the full extent of its powers, instead relying upon the
state governors to concur with the Secretary's determination as the
last act necessary to carry out the Executive's power. In short, the
court saw "a statute in which Congress delegates to a state official
the power to veto a favorable determination by an official of the
Executive Branch who was legislatively charged with making that
determination." 10 The statute "grants the Governor the power to
negate the DOI's determination if it is favorable,'.. which the
district court held clearly intruded upon the powers of the
Executive branch.
Accordingly, the court ordered the offending "governor's veto"
provision severed from the IGRA.12 However, the district court's
remedy encompassed the entire "after-acquired lands" provision.
This order made moot the Tribes' application to take land into
trust, since, under the district court's severance order, there was no
longer an exception to the ban on gaming on lands acquired after
October 17, 1988. This situation formed the basis for the Tribes'
appeal.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision on both issues. The court first held that the governor's
veto does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, since it
"does not undermine an executive function, [but] merely places
restrictions on the Executive's ability to choose which land is to be
taken into trust for gaming purposes-a legislative function."
1 3
The provision also passed muster under the Appointments Clause,
because "the authority vested in the state governors through IGRA
[did] not rise to the level of that of an officer of the United
States."1 4 The Ninth Circuit's decision was incorrect on both
counts.
1. The Separation of Powers Claim--On the separation of powers
question, the court held that since Congress and not the Executive
branch has the power to make determinations regarding Indian
land, and since Congress has in fact done so by delegating that
power to the Secretary of the Interior, there was no violation of the
110. Id. at 1488.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1490.
113. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. United States, 110 F.3d 688, 696
(9th Cir. 1997).
114. Id. at 697.
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doctrine of separation of powers." 5 The court stated that while the
Supreme Court has not enumerated a list of factors to be con-
sulted in examining such claims, courts must consider "(1) the
governmental branch to which the function in question is tradi-
tionally assigned, and (2) the control of the function retained by
the branch."'lr
After noting that Congress has the power both to acquire and
dispose of federal property and to legislate in the area of Indian
affairs, the court relied upon the notion of "contingent legislation"
as embodied in J. W Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States"' to show
that Congress had validly delegated its power in this area:
Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine ex-
actly when its exercise of the legislative power should become
effective, because dependent upon future conditions, and it
may leave the determination of such time to the decision of
an Executive, or, as often happens in matters of state legisla-
tion, it may be left to a popular vote of the residents of a
district to be affected by the legislation. While in a sense one
may say that such residents are exercising legislative power, it
is not an exact statement because [t]he power has already been
exercised legislatively by the body vested with that power under the
Constitution, the condition of its legislation going into effect
on the expression of the voters of a certain district. 1
8
The argument is that Congress delegated to Interior the power
to make an exception to the "after-acquired lands" ban, contingent
upon the governor's consent. The power to take land into trust for
an Indian tribe off its reservation for gaming purposes is dormant,
in a sense, until the governor of the state concurs with the Secre-
tary's determination of benefit to the tribe and the surrounding
community. This implies that the governor's action is simply minis-
terial and does not involve any actual decision-making or policy-
making.
This cannot be the case; the Secretary's determination hinges
decisively upon the governor's concurrence. To say that this is an
example of "contingent legislation" is to state half the case; left un-
stated is that Congress has, in fact, delegated to the Secretary of
the Interior the power only to act in accord with the wishes of a
state official. Here, the state governors, substituted by Congress for
115. Id. at 694.
116. Id. (internal citations omitted).
117. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
118. 110 F.3d at 695 (quoting 276 U.S. at 407) (emphasis added).
1252 [VOL. 37:4
A Whole New Game
the Secretary of the Interior, run the Department of the Interior
for purposes of land-into-trust determinations under § 2719. The
Ninth Circuit sought support for its questionable ruling in this
case in a 1939 decision regarding tobacco marketing restrictions1t
and a 1935 case regarding oil refining.1 20 Neither of these cases
provide compelling support for the court's decision.
The Currin case, in contrast to the "after-acquired lands" provi-
sion at issue here, conditioned the imposition of federal regulation
on the two-thirds vote of the affected tobacco farmers. Before the
vote, the federal government did not regulate the tobacco market
in question under the Commerce Clause in any way. These were
local markets, not otherwise subjected to federal oversight under
the Interstate Commerce Clause. After an affirmative two-thirds
vote of the affected farmers, the market was subjected to federal
regulation and inspection. By contrast, the "after-acquired lands"
provision, and the larger statute of which it is a part, provides
complete federal preemption over the field of Indian gaming. A
lack of concurrence by the governor of a state does not render the
regulation a nullity; Curin would control if the governor of the
affected state could refuse to have IGRA apply to her state, or if the
legislature could simply exempt itself from IGRA in its entirety ab-
sent a Gun-in-like vote for inclusion.' Not only was the tobacco
market in Cun-in free from federal regulation absent a vote, but
the party voting in consideration of the issue was the same party
potentially subject to regulation. By contrast, under the "gover-
nor's veto" situation, more than one party is affected by the
proposed regulation. The question in Cun-in was whether some
local tobacco markets could constitutionally be regulated as inter-
state commerce upon an affirmative consenting vote of those
tobacco merchants; no such question is at stake in Siletz. Curin,
therefore, provides no support for the court's decision.
Panama Refining dealt with whether Congress may constitution-
ally delegate legislative power to the executive branch. In holding
that it can, the Court stated that the provision at issue
119. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939). This case was cited with approval by Lac
Courte Oreilles Band, No. 03-2323.
120. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
121. This is the position of the state of Maine, which has argued that it could exempt it-
self from IGRA, despite the Supremacy Clause and Indian Commerce Clause issues. See
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 897 F. Supp. 632 (D. Me. 1995), aff'd, 75 F.3d 784 (1st Cir.
1996). The court held that IGRA did not implicitly repeal portions of the Maine Indian
Claims Settlement Act of 1980, which requires that federal Indian laws specifically apply in
Maine. Id.
SUMMER 2004] 1253
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
is brief and unambiguous.... It does not qualify the Presi-
dent's authority by reference to the basis, or extent, of the
state's limitation of production.... It establishes no criterion
to govern the President's course. It does not require any find-
ing by the President as a condition of his action. The
Congress in § 9(C) thus declares no policy as to the transpor-
tation of the excess production. So far as this section is
concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority to
determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not
to lay it down, as he may see fit.
122
However, in the present case there are limits to the Secretary's
power, and Congress has prescribed criteria for, and has required
findings as a prerequisite to, the Secretary's actions. Congress has
very strictly delegated to the Secretary the authority to take land
into trust for gaming purposes in an exception to IGRA's ban on
gaming on "after-acquired lands." The present case, therefore, is
distinguishable from Panama Refining, since it does in fact "qualify
the President's authority" by qualifying the authority of the Secre-
tary of the Interior, the President's delegate.
The upshot of the foregoing cases, cited for the proposition that
the "governor's veto" does not violate the doctrine of separation of
powers, is that
the separation of powers between the Executive and Congress
is not a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic
rigor. There must be sensible approximation, there must be
elasticity of adjustment, in response to the practical necessities
of government, which cannot foresee today the developments
of tomorrow in their nearly infinite variety.
12
3
This is just to the point. With reasonable standards in place, the
exercise of delegated power by the Executive branch is not an
exercise of legislative power. Here, the decision to deviate from the
ban on gaming on "after-acquired lands" is done by the state
governors, who are not governed by any standards in their
determination of whether to concur with the Secretary's
evaluation.1 24 justice Cardozo elaborated the point: "to uphold the
122. 293 U.S. at 415.
123. 293 U.S. at 440 (Cardozo,J., dissenting).
124. Wisconsin Governor McCallum stated that he would have found no basis, in any
event, for concurring with the Secretary's determination, simply by virtue of his stand on
Indian gaming in Wisconsin. See Brief for Appellant at 43, Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
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delegation there is need to discover in the terms of the act a
standard reasonably clear whereby discretion must be governed."'25 Here,
the discretion is properly exercised by the Secretary, in
determining that the off-reservation gaming will not harm the
surrounding community and will benefit the applying tribe. It is
the frustration of that discretion (more to the point, the potential
for the standardless frustration of that discretion) via the
"governor's veto," that makes the provision invalid under the
separation of powers doctrine.
The court also erred by focusing on the duration and frequency
of the "governor's veto," and by splitting the governor's actions
conceptually between federal effect and state authority. The point
here is that the governors in fact act, regardless of the duration or
frequency. That the governors are called upon to implement fed-
eral law and policy "on an episodic basis"'16 also does not logically
compel the result that the Act is free from constitutional infirmity.
As to duration, Printz v. United States shows that the Supreme
Court does not care for the time-splitting favored by the Ninth
Circuit. In deciding that county sheriffs could not be "comman-
deered" for federal purposes despite the fact that they were to do
so for the limited time during which the federal enforcement
scheme was impending, the Court in Printz disfavored the view that
the Act "places a minimal and only temporary burden upon state
officers," due to the time limitation.
12 7
2. Appointments Clause Claim-In framing the question whether
§ 2719 violates the Appointments Clause, the Ninth Circuit stated
that the inquiry was "whether, under this statute, the Governor is
performing duties reserved for officers of the United States.",2 To
decide this question, the court pointed to the Supreme Court's
two-part test in Buckley v. Valeo: "whether the Governor exercises
'significant authority' under IGRA, and whether IGRA vests in the
Governor 'primary responsibility' for determining the applicability
of IGRA's exceptions."
29
Attempting to distinguish Buckley v. Valeo, the Ninth Circuit lik-
ened state governors to judges, by stating that the act of making
Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. United States, No. 03-2323, 2004 WL 909159 (7th Cir.
2004).
125. 293 U.S. at 434 (Cardozo,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (internal quotations omitted).
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decisions regarding the applicability of laws does not render
judges "officers" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.
On this view, state governors would not be federal officers, either.
However, judges decide controversies; they decide what law ap-
plies, and then apply it. They do not execute the laws, except in
the limited sense of imposing criminal sentences based on the facts
of particular cases. By contrast, governors, as executive officers, are
called upon daily to ensure the smooth functioning of their states,
by "takling] Care that the Laws [are] faithfully executed."'30
The second source of distinction is equally unavailing. The
court stated that qui tam relators also make significant decisions
regarding the operation of federal law, yet are not considered "of-
ficers" under the Appointments Clause. There is no similarity here,
because without the ability to act somewhat autonomously, the qui
tam power under the False Claims Act1 3' would be a nullity. Absent
the power to act without the approval of the federal government to
bring suits, qui tam relators would not be able to exercise their rai-
son d'etre. By contrast, state governors are still fully empowered
even if they are not allowed to exercise the veto under IGRA. Qui
tam relators are clearly distinguishable from state governors.
Pointing to United States v. Ferry County, in which the taking of
land into trust for an Indian tribe in Washington State was con-
tested on grounds that Buckley v. Valeo was inapplicable since it
dealt with federal officials, rather than local officials, 1 2 the court
raised another arguable point of distinction. However, logic dic-
tates that if Congress may not delegate power within the federal
sphere of action, as in Buckley, then, afortiori, it may not do so with
respect to local officials outside that sphere. Further, the Supreme
Court has since decided Printz, which accomplishes just the result
that Ferry County held could not be done: striking down as violative
of the Appointments Clause the delegation of federal power to lo-
cal officials. 3 3 In light of Printz, Ferry County does not support the
"governor's veto." For this reason, the Siletz decision should be re-
considered in the light of new precedent.
130. U.S. CONST. art. If, § 3, cl. 4.
131. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
132. United States v. Ferry County, 511 F. Supp. 546, 552 (E.D. Wash. 1981).
133. 521 U.S. 898.
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B. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians of Wisconsin v. United States
The Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indi-
ans of Wisconsin, the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Indians of
Wisconsin, and the Sokaogon Chippewa Community, Mole Lake
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (hereafter "the Tribes"),
"seeking to advance their tribal and economic development,"13 4
associated "for the purpose of establishing a jointly owned and op-
erated off-reservation gaming facility in a lucrative location."035 The
Tribes asked the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for
them so that they could convert a horse racing facility in Hudson,
Wisconsin into a casino. 3 6 The track was chosen "because they be-
lieved its proximity to the metropolitan areas of Minneapolis and St.
Paul and easy accessibility to Interstate Highway 94 would ensure a
broad customer base.",3 7 Wisconsin Governor Scott McCallum did
not concur with the Secretary's decision, apparently "citing various
policy and philosophical bases unrelated to the statute's two-factor
standard."'38 Accordingly, the Secretary did not approve the land
into trust application for off-reservation gambling, citing the "gov-
ernor's veto."
3 9
The Tribes then brought suit in federal District Court, making
essentially the same claims as those in Siletz: that the "governor's
veto" violated the Appointments Clause, and that it was an uncon-
stitutional delegation of power under the separation of powers
doctrine. They also claimed that it violated both the Tenth and
134. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. United
States, No. 03-2323, 2004 WL 909159 (7th Cir. 2004).
135. Id.
136. See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Indians v. United States, 259 F.
Supp. 2d 783, 783 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
137. Id.
138. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians ofWis. v. United States, No. 03-2323, 2004 WL 909159 (7th Cir. 2004).
139. See MASON & NELSON, supra note 6, at 73:
In 1997, when [Interior] Secretary Bruce Babbitt rejected an application by three
Chippewa tribes to purchase a Wisconsin dog track located between Milwaukee and
Chicago and convert it into a casino, he was charged with having succumbed to po-
litical pressure from five other tribes that opposed the application and that together
donated around $300,000 to the Democratic party. After a nineteen-month investiga-
tion, an independent counsel appointed to look into the matter exonerated Babbitt.
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Fifth Amendments and that it was a breach of the trust doctrine. 140
This Note will consider the decision in the district court with re-
spect to the Appointments Clause and separation of powers issues
only.
141
1. Separation of Powers Claim-The district court held that the
"governor's veto" does not violate the separation of powers doc-
trine. In doing so, the court fundamentally understated the case:
In giving a say to the governors of states in which the Secre-
tary of the Interior is considering taking lands in trust for
Indian gaming, Congress was not giving state officials author-
ity to execute congressional legislation .... It was doing
nothing more than giving the governors an opportunity to be
heard on matters that affected the interests of their citizens.14
Having simply "an opportunity to be heard" would not allow
state governors to force the Secretary to make one decision or an-
other. The court's statement is belied by the practical effect of the
governors' acts. For the court's statement to be true in the strict
sense, the governors would only be able to comment on the land-
into-trust decision, with no conclusive impact on the decision. The
court essentially held that the Secretary of the Interior still has the
ultimate power to make her own determinations regarding off-
reservation gaming. This holding views the governor's determina-
tion as little but an advisory opinion. However, as the district court
in Siletz pointed out, and as the plain language of the Act makes
clear, the land-into-trust application for gaming operations off-
reservation simply cannot go forward absent the governor's con-
currence. This is far more than simply "an opportunity to be heard
on matters" which affect the state's citizens. It is control over the
process itself.
2. Appointments Clause Claim-The court also held that the
"governor's veto" does not violate the Appointments Clause be-
cause the provision at issue empowers state governors with an
"authority [that] ... is neither significant enough to require ap-
pointment as a federal officer nor exercised pursuant to the laws of
the United States.' 43 Here, the court misapplied the law.
140. The court found no breach of the trust doctrine "because [IGRA] was enacted by
Congress pursuant to the federal government's plenary power over Indians." 259 F Supp.
2d at 787.
141. However, the breach of trust claim, and the District Court's ultimate conclusion as
to that claim, deserves further scrutiny.
142. 259 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
143. Id. at 796.
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The Lac Courte Oreilles court also focused on Buckley v. Valeo, spe-
cifically, the test that "[t] he appointments clause applies to (1) all
executive or administrative officers; (2) who serve pursuant to fed-
eral law; and (3) who exercise significant authority over federal
government actions." 144 The court stated that "[t]he governor of
Wisconsin was never appointed as a federal officer and he is not
one in fact.'' 145 However, the Buckley test does not deal with federal
officers, but with "all executive or administrative officers . .. who
serve pursuant to federal law."14 6 There can be no doubt that a state
governor is an "executive or administrative officer," nor can it be
seriously argued that the governor's concurrence requirement
does not arise under federal law, since IGRA is a federal statute.
The real point of debate, then, is over what constitutes "significant
authority."
The Lac Courte Oreilles court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's rul-
ing, noting that "[t]he governor does not have the sole authority
to enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.' " 7 However, "sole
authority" is not the governing test from Buckley. The question is
whether an officer exercises, pursuant to federal law, "significant
authority." In deciding whether to take land into trust for a tribe to
open a casino, where all other factors have been considered and
all other parties concur, a governor's refusal to concur derails the
entire process. This is "significant authority" over the decision to
take land into trust for a tribal gaming operation. It is, in fact, de-
cisive authority over this question that is vested in the state
governor. Contrary to the District Court's holding, this provision of
IGRA does not survive scrutiny.
The other justification brought forth by the Lac Courte Oreilles
court is that state governors act under state law, which renders the
federal effect of the governor's action irrelevant for constitutional
analysis. This cannot be the case, for surely the state governor un-
derstands, when asked by the Secretary of the Interior whether he
concurs with the Secretary's determination, what the consequences
of his decision will be. Surely the governor also understands that
while this decision will affect state government and the state's peo-
ple, the framework for that decision, and the reason he is making
it in the first instance, is a provision of federal law. There is also no
logical reason state governors cannot be supposed to act pursuant
to federal and state law concurrently. For example, consider police
144. Id. citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id.
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officers: they can surely arrest someone who violates a federal law,
while still discharging their state law responsibilities.
3. Seventh Circuit's Treatment of the Issues on Appeal-The Tribes
appealed the district court's decision to the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, which decided the case on grounds nearly identical to
the Ninth Circuit in Siletz. The centerpiece of the Tribes' appeal
with regard to the separation of powers issue was the Supreme
Court's decision in INS v. Chadha.148 That case involved "Section
244(c) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which
authorized either House of Congress, by resolution, to veto the
Attorney General's decision to suspend the deportation of a
particular alien."49 Since it "prevent[ed] the Executive Branch
from accomplishing its delegated function,"5 ° the statute in Chadha
was invalidated on grounds that it violated the separation of
powers doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit attempted to distinguish the case before it
from Chadha by stating that the "governor's veto" provision of
IGRA, unlike the statute in Chadha, can't be said to have "wrested
final decision-making power away from the Executive Branch over
an issue that had been legislatively entrusted,",5 to the Secretary of
the Interior, "thereby directly imped[ing the Secretary] from ac-
complishing the function delegated.' ' 152 However, the court also
noted that "unless and until the appropriate governor issues a
concurrence, the Secretary of the Interior has no authority under
§ 2719(b) (1) (A) to take land into trust for the benefit of an Indian
tribe for the purpose of the operation of a gaming establish-
ment."' 53 Since the Secretary has the sole authority to take land
into trust for Indian tribes, and since the governor of a state can
prevent this action, it logically follows that in this situation, Con-
gress has enabled state governors to "directly impede [the
Secretary] from accomplishing the function delegated."15 4 In that
sense, the Tribes were correct in their reliance upon Chadha.
The Seventh Circuit's reasoning here suffers from a crippling
formalism. While it is strictly true, at least in a ministerial sense,
that "only the Secretary of the Interior may execute the
§ 2719(b) (1) (A) exception to IGRA's general prohibition of gam-
148. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).







ing on after-acquired land,"15 5 left unstated is that the Secretary
simply may not even consider whether to take land into trust for
gaming purposes unless and until the appropriate state governor
gives his or her approval. In practical terms, then, it is simply not
true that "IGRA does not empower any governor to perform [the]
function" 156 of taking land into trust for gaming purposes. For all
practical purposes, it cannot be said that IGRA "does not require
or even permit any governor to execute federal law." 151 Manifestly,
it does; without the governor's concurrence, no land may be taken
into trust for gaming purposes where the land at issue does not fall
into the other exceptions to the "after-acquired lands" gaming
ban.
With respect to the Appointments Clause issue, the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that "a governor's role under § 2719(b) (1) (A) is limited
to satisfying one precondition to the Secretary of the Interior's au-
thority,"158 to allow gaming despite the "after-acquired lands" ban.
Again, only half the case is stated, since in many cases, this pre-
condition is dispositive of the issue. At least in this respect, it is
simply untrue that state governors "do not enjoy power under
§ 2719(b) (1) (A) to enforce or administer federal law.'' 5 9 For land-
into-trust determinations under 2719(b) (1) (A), the governor's
concurrence is a necessary prerequisite to evading the ban on
gaming on "after-acquired lands," and in fulfilling this necessary
step, state governors assist in the administration of IGRA, a federal
law.
C. U.S. v. Printz
While Chadha is useful to the analysis of § 2719(b) (1) (A), the
"governor's veto" provision of IGRA is properly analyzed under the
Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Printz.'60 The case concerned a
1993 amendment (The Brady Act)' 6 to The Gun Control Act of




158. Id. (slip op. at 17).
159. Id.
160. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
161. The Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (2000).
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concerning checks on gun purchasers until federal enforcement
took effect. The Court there held that the Appointments Clause
did not allow the federal government to use sheriffs in this way:
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to ad-
minister or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters
not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case
weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such com-
mands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty."3
The intended duration of the challenged statutory scheme was
noted as well by the Printz Court. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, notes at the outset that "it is apparent that the Brady Act
purports to direct state law enforcement officers to participate, al-
beit only temporarily, in the administration of a federally enacted
regulatory scheme."' 4 The temporary nature of the sheriffs' role in
the federal gun control scheme under the Brady Act was not a
mitigating factor in Printz.
The "governor's veto" here is in fact a stronger Printz-type case
in that respect. Here, the governors are permanently required to
make conclusive determinations bearing upon federal law and pol-
icy, either by action or by silence. As in Printz, state governors are
charged with an essential duty in a comprehensive federal scheme.
This case does not have what might be seen as Printz's mitigating
factor: the temporary nature of the "conscription." Here the state
governors are tasked with a role in a federal regulatory scheme
which extends into the indefinite future. This conscription, as in
Printz, is unconstitutional.
The sheriffs under the Brady Act "are empowered to grant, in
effect, waivers of the federally prescribed 5-day waiting period for
handgun purchases."0 5 Under the "governor's veto" provision, the
state governors are similarly empowered: state governors under
§ 2719(a) have the power to prevent or allow the Secretary of the
Interior to deviate from the ban on gaming operations conducted
on lands acquired, with the noted exceptions, after 1988. While
the subject matter of Printz is very different from the Indian gam-
ing statute that is the subject of this Note, the rule the Court sets
163. 521 U.S. at 935.
164. Id. at 904 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 904-05.
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forth, based squarely on the Court's precedents, 6  describes a
situation strikingly similar to the "governor's veto" provision of
§ 2719(a).
The Printz Court distinguished between statutes "which require
only the provision of information to the Federal Government,"
and those showing "the forced participation of the States' execu-
tive in the actual administration of a federal program."1 67 The
"governor's veto" could be characterized as either a "provision of
information" to Interior or as a "forced participation" in IGRA's
regulatory scheme. However, a mere "provision of information"
would have no conclusive effect on the outcome; here, there are
consequences to the governors' actions in the context of
§ 2719(a). The governor's concurrence has a conclusive effect on
the decision to take land into trust for gaming purposes under
IGRA. The "governor's veto" provision reduces the Secretary of the
Interior's role to a "rubber stamp" approval of the application. Un-
fortunately, both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits erred on this
point, which the Seventh Circuit impliedly admitted by conceding
that the state governors can play a dispositive role in this federal
regulatory scheme even by "gubernatorial inaction."'"" As a matter
of law, it is simply untrue that § 2719(b) (1) (A) "neither imposes
on the States nor depends on them for the implementation of fed-
eral law." 6" As shown by the letter and the operation of IGRA, the
Secretary of the Interior's determinations regarding an exception
to the ban on tribal gaming on "after-acquired lands" depend ines-
capably upon the action of state governors.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: ENHANCED
DEFAULT COMPACT TERMS
At its best, the tribal-state compacting provision of IGRA created
a framework for contracting between two interested parties that
happen to be sovereigns. However, giving one party veto power
166. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the "take ti-
tle" provision of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which
provided that states must either accept ownership of waste or regulate according to Con-
gress's instructions, was beyond Congress's enumerated powers and was inconsistent with
the Tenth Amendment, as it would have either "commandeered" states into a federal regu-
latory scheme, or simply required states to implement federal legislation).
167. 521 U.S. at918.
168. Supra note 35 (slip op. at 21).
169. Id.
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over the eventual deal undermines this paradigm of limited free-
dom of contract and lessens the potential effectiveness of IGRA as
a means of tribal economic and cultural advancement. Each sover-
eign, tribal and state, is in a stronger position for being able to
negotiate any terms relevant to Indian gaming operations. If the
tribe and the state simply cannot agree to the scope and site of
gaming operations off-reservation, the compact will not include an
off-reservation gaming provision. But if, as is increasingly the case,
the state and the tribe can reach agreement on this issue, off-
reservation gaming can commence on terms favorable to both par-
ties.
A. The Proposed Reforms
The first reform proposed would significantly amend IGRA at
§ 2719(b) (1) (A). The language proposed is as follows:
Subsection (a) of this section will not apply when-
the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and ap-
propriate State and local officials, including officials of other
nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment
on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the
Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental
to the surrounding community; and
the governing Tribal-State gaming compact specifically pro-
vides for gaming operations on lands outside the exterior
boundaries of the Tribe's reservation.
The "governor's veto" would be removed from the Act, since
there would be no need for protection of either party in the com-
pacting process, other than a general, procedural oversight
exercised by the Secretary of the Interior to remove any taint of
fraud, duress or unconscionability in the compact negotiation
process. Investor and party expectations would be preserved, and
the compacting process would gain a considerable degree of pre-
dictability for all concerned.
This reform would also ensure that the question of off-reservation
gaming would not normally even come before the Secretary; unless
the parties had agreed on the issue, off-reservation gaming
development simply would not occur. However, this reform would
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reward foresight on the part of both tribes and states that bargain
on this point. The ultimate decision on this issue, as is currently
the case for approval of compacts generally, would rest with the
Secretary, who would balance the interests of various parties. This
more closely aligns with the Act's original intent.
Another necessary reform is a more specific expression of a
cause of action for litigation connected to off-reservation gaming.
Tribes require a specific "breach of compact" action broader than
the current one, which states that "[a] ny Tribal-State compact ne-
gotiated under subparagraph (A) may include provisions relating
to-... (v) remedies for breach of contract."7° This proposal
would require deleting subsection (v), and adding a subparagraph
(D) to § 2710(d) (3):
All Tribal-State gaming compacts negotiated under subpara-
graph (A) shall provide remedies for breach of the terms of
the compact, including, if applicable, a federal cause of action
for failure of the State governor to concur in the Secretary's
determination under 25 USC § 2719 (b) (1) (A) where off-
reservation gaming is provided for in the approved Tribal-
State compact governing the gaming operations in ques-
tion.171
The mandatory language is required, because, in its absence, a
tribe could set up class II gaming off-reservation, evading the
compact requirement for class III gaming. 172  The proposed
amendment would also exclude class I gaming from the "after-
acquired lands" restriction, and all land-into-trust decisions would
also still be subjected to the threshold inquiry whether the land is
170. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (C) (v) (2000).
171. The alternate language regarding the governor's concurrence would only be nec-
essary in the event that the first reform is not in place.
172. There is a growing body of case law regarding 'scope of gaming' disputes and so-
called "class 2.9" gaming. The issue in these cases revolves around the language in the stat-
ute referring to technologic aids. Some tribes have set up class II machines that very
successfully mimic class III machines, removing the need for a Tribal-State compact. See, e.g.,
United States v. 103 Electronic Gambling Devices, 223 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that
an electronic terminal linking players in a networked bingo game classified as class II,
rather than class III, because it was a "technologic aid" to a bingo game, rather than an
"electronic facsimile" of a game of chance); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National
Indian Gaming Comm'n, 14 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that games wholly incorpo-
rated into electronic or electromechanical versions are excluded from class II); Spokane
Indian Tribe v. United States, 972 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that games were not
merely electronic aids to increase the number of players, but were electronic facsimiles of
games of chance, and hence were excluded from class II category).
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to be used for gaming, instead of other forms of development or
community use.
'Another useful reform would introduce an implied, limited
waiver of state and tribal sovereign immunity from suit for claims
arising under the compact's terms. There is no point in negotiat-
ing a contract with no remedies, either express or implied, on
which to rely. While both states and tribes might find this proposal
unsettling, it is a necessary reform, and one increasingly in use in a
wide array of tribal business dealings with non-tribal actors.
The final reform proposed here is the alteration of language in
the beginning of IGRA. The new language recognizes the inten-
tion for the Act to become a set of "background" or default terms
for Tribal-State compacting, which would be added to the state-
ment of the policy of the Act, in 25 USC § 2702(4)-(5):
(4) to provide the background terms in the formation, and
remedies for breach, of Tribal-State gaming compacts to en-
sure that gaming compacts are formed on balanced terms and
free from duress in the pursuit of State policy goals and Tribal
economic self-determination; and
(5) to reflect the understanding that Tribal-State gaming
compacts under this chapter are to be considered as negoti-
ated agreements between sovereigns in all respects.
These proposed reforms would avoid the Seminole Tribe issue, be-
cause the remedies noted in the compact would be freely waived
by the state, rather than abrogated by Congress. The limited waiver
of sovereign immunity as an implied term in every compact also
furthers this interest. The remedy itself is up to the parties; creativ-
ity could be used to great effect by the parties, since the proposal
does not specify the exact remedy but only that there be one pro-
vided. The remedy could be a federal or state cause of action, a
durational waiver or suspension of revenue-sharing payments or
state regulatory controls, among many other possibilities. Finally,
the Secretary of the Interior's continuing duty to review and ap-
prove any compact would probably be held to include a review of
the sufficiency of the remedy.
At present, few compacts provide for the possibility of off-
reservation gaming. A practical result of the enactment of these
proposals would be that compacts across the country would likely
come up for renegotiation by tribes eager to locate gaming facili-
ties on land taken into trust off their reservation and closer to
more lucrative markets. There would be a price for this privilege,
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of course, the exact price to be settled upon by the parties. Once
the compact language is agreed upon, and the site is selected, the
Secretary would then engage in the current two-step determina-
tion of benefit to the tribe and lack of detriment to the
surrounding community, as a check on the fairness of the bargain-
ing process.
This proposal also would not allow a tribe to evade the terms of
its compact with State A by seeking to place land off-reservation in
State B into trust for the purposes of gaming. The tribe in this hy-
pothetical would still need a gaming compact with State B. The
statute's language ("Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on
Indian lands only if such activities are-... located in a State that
permits such gaming for any purpose ... and [are] conducted in
conformance with a Tribal-State compact.") 173 would still control.
States may want to bargain for a provision that restricts any off-
reservation land-into-trust attempts to land within the borders of
the state, to channel the collateral economic effects of the tribe's
development to those places the state wants to develop under its
own planning. An example of this is the Seneca Compact's desig-
nation of the Buffalo/Niagara Falls area as the site for tribal
gaming. 74 The lesson from the Seneca compact in this respect is
that when the tribes and states start to think of each other as busi-
ness partners, at least with respect to gaming compact negotiations
and implementation, each party benefits from a greater degree of
flexibility and creativity in structuring the deal. The status quo sti-
fles economic development and precludes states from "getting a
piece of the action." It makes little sense to cut a state off from
such opportunities on a theory of unfettered state's rights.
These reforms, enacted together, would present the best out-
come for the tribes. In addition to the reduction of uncertainty,
these reforms of the compacting process would increase the "de
facto" sovereignty of tribes, as they get closer to functional, rather
than merely theoretical, self-sufficiency. 175 The IGRA must evolve to
accurately reflect the changing situation in the Indian gaming in-
dustry, and these reforms would make this happen.
173. 25 U.S.C §§ 2710(d) (1) (B),(C) (2000).
174. See supra note 24.
175. See, e.g., Lorie Graham, Securzng Economic Sovereignty Through Agreement, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 523 (2003).
SUMMER 20041 1267
University of Michigan Jmrnal of Law Reform
B. The Recent Seneca Compact and
Secretary Norton's Objections
One example of the motive force of this paradigm is the recent
compact negotiations between the Seneca Nation and the State of
New York. 76 There, the parties expressly placed off-reservation
gaming sites within the terms of their compact, by including one
site at Niagara Falls, and one in the Buffalo, New York area. 177 This
was done because, in the astute calculation of the Senecas, there
was no on-reservation site that would place the future gaming facil-
ity near a viable market for gambling; by contrast, the Buffalo and
Niagara Falls locations would provide strong customer bases for a
future gaming facility. In line with this provision, the Senecas
sought, and obtained, "geographic exclusivity" in a 25-mile radius
(effectively excluding the Tuscarora Indian Nation and Tonawanda
Band of Seneca Indians) and within defined boundaries as to po-
tential competitors. 78 These provisions formed the basis for the
revenue sharing agreement between the State and the Nation, on a
graduated scale." 9
However, when the compact was submitted to the Secretary of
the Interior for approval, Secretary Norton chose to take no ac-
tion, thereby treating the compact as approved. 80 The stated
reason for inaction was her concern "that elements of this Com-
pact may be used by future parties to proliferate off-reservation
gaming development on lands not identified as part of a Congres-
sional settlement but instead on lands selected solely based on economic
potential, wholly devoid of any other legitimate connection."'8' Stating that
she is "extremely concerned that the principles underlying the en-
actment of IGRA are being stretched in ways Congress never
176. Note that with respect to the Seneca off-reservation gaming, an exception to the
ban on gambling on "after-acquired lands" was found, since the land in question was pur-
chased with proceeds from a land claim settlement. Hence, as the Seneca Tribe's lawyer
Barry Brandon successfully argued, the settlement funds themselves, used to purchase land,
attained the character of settlement lands. See Robert Lennon, Akin Gump Rolls the Dice, Am.
LAW., May 2003, at 22.
177. See Nation-State Gaming Compact Between the Seneca Nation of Indians and the
State of New York at para. 11 [hereinafter Seneca Compact] (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
178. See Seneca Compact at para. 12.
179. Id. at para. 12(b).
180. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (8) (C) (2000).
181. See Letter from Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton to The Honorable Cyrus
Schindler, President, Seneca Nation of Indians, at 2 (Nov. 12, 2002) (emphasis added) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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imagined when enacting IGRA,", 82 and based on her belief that
"IGRA does not envision that off-reservation gaming would be-
come pervasive,"18 3 Secretary Norton decided to allow the Seneca
Compact to come into force without expressly approving it. She
also stated that her determination on land-into-trust applications,
absent a settlement act (such as the unique one under which the
Senecas claimed) would likely differ substantially.
Secretary Norton's concerns are problematic. First, the lack of
foresight of the drafters of IGRA is clear, since it is fair to say that
no member of Congress foresaw the incredible success that Indian
gaming would become. It does not follow from that, however, that
Congress therefore meant to restrict gaming to the fewest and
most isolated areas possible.8 4 After all, a provision for off-
reservation gaming, and specifically for secretarial waiver of the
general ban on such gaming was present in the Act from the be-
ginning. The Act was meant to promote tribal economic
development; on that view, a particular parcel of land "selected
based solely on economic potential," cannot be more "legitimately
connect[ed]" to the tribe's development and future vitality. The
irony of the fact that the Secretary of the Interior, the trustee-
delegate of the United States for the Indian tribes, suggests that an
economic motive for site selection for off-reservation gaming facili-
ties is illegitimate should prompt serious discussion of the
Secretary's true motives and concerns.185
Another problematic aspect of the Secretary's statement is the
fear that Indian gaming would become "pervasive." Presumably,
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 2.
184. Almost by definition, Indian land is economically non-viable:
Seventeen of 22 tribal gambling operations in Washington State are in rural areas,
located on land that Native Americans were forced onto. (The Northern Quest in
Airway Heights is a rare exception of an off-reservation tribal casino.) Such land is
generally bereft of the resources needed to build a sustainable economy. Therefore,
tribal options for creating jobs and raising revenue for basic services are limited.
Gambling has been the best way for tribes to surmount the disadvantages handed
them.
Unfair Advantages Were In The Cards, SPOKESMAN-REvIEW (Spokane, W¥A), Oct. 9, 2003, at B4.
185. Comments like this bring to mind the quotation from Professor Tsosie, supra note
5, regarding the perceived authenticity of the various fields of tribal economic endeavor.
Secretary Norton seems to feel that a legitimate connection to the parcel of land for which
trust status is sought is not economic, but traditional, spiritual, or some ineffable 'connec-
tion to the land.' In truth, tribes have economic needs; it is rational that they seek out the
best avenues for providing for those needs, regardless of archaic and stereotypical images of
Indians as anachronisms.
SUMMER 2004] 1269
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
she has no problem with every tribe owning a casino, as long as
they only occupy reservation land. Perhaps the real concern is that
casinos will become pervasive in urban areas, where they would
compete with non-Indian gaming and entertainment enterprises.
While it may be true that "the principles underlying the enactment
of IGRA are being stretched in ways Congress never imagined,"
that is appropriate to the circumstances. The Indian gaming indus-
try (not even an industry in 1988) operates in ways and on a scale
that Congress didn't foresee when it enacted IGRA.
Secretary Norton's comments point to the need for an
amendment to IGRA recognizing that market forces in the Indian
gaming industry have overtaken the force of coerced segregation
of tribal businesses on reservations. Secretary Norton's concerns
seem to be echoed by others, who find it "unseemly" that a tribe
would attempt to enter into commercial dealings via contracting
with commercial gambling operators on off-reservation land.M6 As
this Note has demonstrated, there is nothing "unseemly" at all
about a government entity utilizing what means are at its disposal
to provide for essential government services in the absence of
sufficient resources. States do this, in part, by authorizing lotteries;
tribes do this, in part, by authorizing casinos. It is worth asking why
tribal casinos are vociferously condemned and state lotteries are
not, since each serve the same, equally important, function: the
provision of governmental revenues.
C. The Public Policy Rationale for Reform
Finally, there is a strong public policy rationale for the proposed
change. If, as this Note argues, it is time to allow tribes and states to
negotiate on a nearly unfettered basis regarding the terms of class III
gaming, off-reservation siting included, it is apparent that the field
for negotiation should be level, in order to allow both parties the
maximum freedom to contract regarding off-reservation gaming.
Two major problems with failing to make a reform such as this im-
mediately spring to mind.
First, unless an amendment in line with the suggested proposal
is adopted, tribes would have no effective remedy for a "breach of
compact" action, since the federal right of action in IGRA for a
"breach of contract," at least with respect to off-reservation gam-
ing, conflicts with the "governor's veto" provision. If the economics
186. See MASON & NELSON, supra note 6, at 78.
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of the deal changes, or if a new governor chooses not to abide by
the terms of the compact regarding off-reservation gaming, a tribe
has no independent recourse. A tribe may be able to persuade the
federal government to sue on its behalf, as trustee, but it is uncer-
tain whether they would prevail in that task, since, as has been
amply demonstrated recently in the District Court for the District
of Columbia,187 the Secretary of the Interior's commitment to her
responsibilities as trustee-delegate is, charitably put, open to ques-
tion. 188
Another problem could exist where the signatory to the com-
pact and the governor are not identical. Some controversy has
arisen over the validity of compacts negotiated and signed by a
state governor without the ratification or consent of the legisla-
ture, as mandated by law in some states.18 9 Since the distribution of
187. SeeCobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
188.
It would be difficult to find a more historically mismanaged federal program than
the Individual Indian Money (IIM) trust.... Generations of IIM trust beneficiaries
have been born and raised with the assurance that their trustee, the United States,
was acting properly with their money. Just as many generations have been denied any
such proof, however. 'If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case
better calculated to excite them could scarcely be imagined.'
Notwithstanding all of this, defendants, the trustee-delegates of the United States,
continue to write checks on an account that they cannot balance or reconcile. The
court knows of no other program in American government in which federal officials are allowed
to write checks-some of which are known to be written in erroneous amounts--from unrecon-
ciled accounts-some of which are known to have incorrect balances. Such behavior certainly
would not be tolerated from private sector trustees. It is fiscal and governmental irre-
sponsibility in its purest form.
The United States' mismanagement of the IIM trust is far more inexcusable than
garden-variety trust mismanagement of a typical donative trust. For the beneficiaries
of this trust did not voluntarily choose to have their lands taken from them; they did
not willingly relinquish pervasive control of their money to the United States. The
United States imposed this trust on the Indian people. As the government concedes,
the purpose of the IIM trust was to deprive plaintiffs' ancestors of their native lands
and rid the nation of their tribal identity. The United States reaped the 'benefit' of
this imposed program long ago-sixty-five percent of what were previously tribal
land holdings quickly opened up to non-Indian settlement. But the United States has
refused to act in accordance with the fiduciary obligations attendant to the imposi-
tion of the trust, which are not imposed by statute.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
189. See, e.g., Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd, 104
F.3d 1546, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (finding that the state constitutional separation of pow-
ers doctrine prevented the governor from binding the state to a Tribal-State gaming
compact); Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 827 F. Supp. 37 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 43 F.3d
1491 (stating that the governor's inability to bind the state to a compact invalidated the
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duties between the branches of state government is purely a matter
of state law and policy, it is conceivable that the legislature would
be the body to approve the compact, thereby binding the state to
the deal. However, if an off-reservation casino comes into play, the
governor (who may have opposed the deal in the first place, while
being powerless to stop the legislature from approving it) would be
the one holding all the cards, as the person whose concurrence
would be necessary for the land to be taken into trust. Allowing
this situation to persist undermines the parties' expectations, and
could prevent future investment in some of these ventures.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is considerable controversy over Indian gaming and es-
pecially the operation of Indian gaming facilities outside
reservation boundaries. Foes of IGRA, Indian and non-Indian
alike, have characterized it as a destructive, addictive, and unsus-
tainable method of economic development. There are methods
states can use to prevent the emergence of Indian gaming in
their states other than the "governor's veto," such as restricting
or banning gambling in their state altogether.'90 Under the Su-
preme Court's Seminole Tribe decision they can simply refuse to
negotiate at all. Yet, if the parties decide to bargain over Indian
gaming, they should be able to put all their cards on the table, in
pursuit of their best possible deal, which may include off-
reservation gaming facilities. The contractual model set forth
here simply adds another bargaining tool by adding more poten-
tial elements to the negotiating process. The proposed reforms
would allow all sides to achieve their aims, while still fostering
the respect for sovereignty each side requires. As it becomes in-
creasingly apparent that Indian gaming is driven more by market
proximity than reservation boundaries, and as Indian gaming
strives to meet the demands of those markets, it should be appar-
ent to states and tribes that the "governor's veto" should be
abandoned in favor of a framework for off-reservation gaming
which is solely addressed by the Tribal-State gaming compact's
terms.
compact, despite the Secretary's actions treating the compact as approved); State ex rel.
Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995) (finding that IGRA's compacting provisions do
not empower governors to act beyond their powers under the state's constitution and the
state's separation of powers doctrine).
190. See MASON & NELSON, supra note 6, at 78.
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A Whole New Game
The impediments to the success of Indian gaming, conducted
on reservations or off, are surmounted not by coercion but
through cooperation. Tribal casinos cannot survive and prosper
without the infrastructure and the market that non-Indian com-
munities have to offer. Non-Indian communities cannot afford to
address the social and economic concerns they have without fa-
vorable treatment from Indian gaming operations. Both sides
have much to offer and much to gain. Currently, IGRA does not
reflect this dynamic, but rather places states in a dominant posi-
tion with respect to off-reservation gaming. This arrangement
stifles the growth and diversity of tribal economies, and prevents
states from truly benefiting from tribal economic development.
Amending IGRA to remove the "governor's veto" would have
significant positive impacts on Indian and non-Indian communi-
ties.
The question of off-reservation gaming will not go away. As of
the summer of 2003, there were eight land-into-trust applications
for gaming pending at Interior, with many more expected, in-
cluding at least one interstate off-reservation application. 9'
Potential off-reservation sites in close proximity to population
centers continue to be identified. 192 Current off-reservation loca-
tions are being expanded as their potential becomes clear.
193
Given the incredible effects of Indian gaming money across the
country, it is incumbent upon Congress to provide both states
and tribes the maximum set of compact terms possible, to both
achieve the purposes of the Act, and to provide states with strong
reasons to bargain with tribes. Amending IGRA by removing the
"governor's veto" and adding both the possibility of negotiating
191. See Martin Statement, supra note 31; see also INDIANZ.COM, KANSAS TRIBE Buys
LAND IN ANCESTRAL RESERVATION, available at: http://www.indianz.com/News/archive/
000108.asp (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) (reporting that
the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, a tribe in Kansas, has purchased ancestral land in the
state of Illinois, upon which it may pursue gaming operations); INDIANZ.COM, NIGC RULES
AGAINST OKLAHOMA TRIBE'S CASINO IN KANSAS, available at http://www.indianz.com/
News/archive/000900.asp (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(reporting that the NIGC ordered a class II gaming operation in Kansas City, Kansas to shut
down because the tract of land on which the casino sits is not within the tribe's "last reserva-
tion"); Memorandum from Maria Getoff, Staff Attorney, to Phil Hogen, Chairman, NIGC,
"Legality of Gaming under the IGRA on the Shriner Tract owned by the Wyandotte Tribe,"
at 13 (Mar. 24, 2004) (on file with the author).
192. See Steve Schultze, Kenosha Casino May Create 6,000Jobs, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL,
Jan. 21, 2004, at B1; see also Deborah Frazier, Don't Bet on New Casino Just Yet, ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN NEwS,Jan. 21, 2004, at A20.
193. See Kim Crompton, Kalispels Launch Major Northern Quest Project, SPOKANE J. OF
Bus., Feb. 12, 2004, available at: http://www.spokanejournal.com/printer-friendly.php?id=
article&sub=1876&print (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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off-reservation location provisions in tribal-state gaming com-
pacts and an explicit cause of action for "breach of compact"
would accomplish these worthy aims.
